

1918: DEFINING VICTORY

THE AUSTRALIAN STAFF: THE FORGOTTEN MEN OF THE FIRST AIF

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Among the all the famous technological improvements, tactical advances and enhanced training methods referred to in the context of achieving victory in 1918, there is one vital element that rarely rates a mention—the staff.

In his memoirs dealing with the great victories on the Western Front in 1918, Lieutenant-General Sir John Monash wrote, 'there must be a word of recognition of the work of the devoted and able Staffs. It was upon them, after all, that the principal burden of the campaign rested'.¹

This claim is at odds with the popular view of the Staff, first invented by the front line troops during the War and constantly embellished in subsequent passage through the generations. Siegfried Sassoon described the staff as 'those scarlet majors at the base, fierce and bald and short of breath, who stand compared but poorly with the glum heroes of the line, sacrificed to their inept commands'.² The contemporary image is no more positive. Who can forget the theatre of 'Oh What a Lovely War' or the portrayals of staff officers in that very entertaining television series 'Blackadder'? The 'incompetence' of the staff and the size of the 'butcher's bill' are two contemporary images of that conflict that are inextricably linked in the public mind.

The widely held perception that the Imperial authorities deliberately used Dominion troops in high risk operations, in preference to risking British lives, may well have added to Australians' already well developed anti-staff views. The adverse image of the staff officer is further exacerbated by the presence, especially in the early years of the AIF, of British Officers in key staff appointments. Monash himself claimed that the 'Australianisation' of the Staff was a factor in improving the overall performance of the AIF and that during the formation of the Australian Corps in 1918 there was a major effort made to appoint qualified Australians to staff and command positions.³ However, the analysis necessary to support Monash's assertion that the replacement of the British Officer by an Australian improved the AIF's fighting efficiency has yet to be done.

Of these two views of the Staff, Sassoon's or Monash's, one must be wrong. The question is which one? The only way to answer this question with any certainty would be to undertake a detailed analysis of the performance of each individual staff officer, examining the decisions he made, based on the information and resources he possessed, against the eventual outcome. This has not yet been done. Even general comment on the staff is limited. One reputable bibliography lists more than 6000 books on the First World War, not including the countless articles, specialist magazines, unpublished papers and theses that address the topic.⁴ With remarkably few exceptions, the role of the staff officer rates little mention, other than in passing, negative asides. Nor has the existence of several excellent biographies of several prominent staff officers improved the overall staff officer profile.

This essay is intended to provide an overview of the staff structure that guided the AIF through the last year of the war. For many Australian readers with a professional military background, there will be little that is new because the staff arrangement and organisation that emerged finely honed from 1918 served as the model for the Australian Army's staff structure until recently.

What of the image of the staff officer that has sustained the popular antipathy towards him? In practically all portrayals of the 'red tabbed Staff Officer', one common charge levelled at him is ignorance: ignorance of the conditions under which the front line soldiers were operating and ignorance of the consequences of orders issued by him in the comfort and security of a headquarters based far from the fighting. There is sufficient data on the staff of 1918 to test the validity of this perception.

Any analysis of the staff strikes an immediate problem. What is a staff officer? This deceptively simple question is in fact very complex and there is no satisfactory answer. As we will see shortly, staff were employed in many roles at several different levels of headquarters and held widely different ranks. They could hold the formal staff qualification of 'Passed Staff College' (psc), obviously gained by completing an approved course of study at a Staff College. Many who worked in staff positions in 1918, as indeed still occurs today, did not have that qualification.

Before the Great War, the term 'staff officer' had two distinct applications. In its precise application it referred to an officer serving on the newly formed 'General Staff or, more pedantically, 'Imperial General Staff', from where the shorthand reference 'G' staff came. Until the war, the term tended to be used for officers serving at the politico/strategic level in organisations such as the War Office. It had another, broader application as well when it was used to describe any officer attached to or on a staff. The Brigade Administrative Officer was a staff officer under this definition.

In Australia, the term 'Staff Officer' has been in use since the beginning of the Army. In his first Annual Report to Parliament in May 1903, Sir Edward Hutton complained of the lack of 'assistance of experienced and qualified Staff Officers of the Imperial Army'.⁵ It would appear, from the context, that he meant administrative and organisational staff as well as operational planners and strategic thinkers.

There are other difficulties. In commenting on the staff of 1915-18, most authors fail to distinguish between the staff and the command function. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig's reputation for indifference and incompetence as a commander seems to have rubbed off onto any officer unfortunate enough to have served as staff on a headquarters somewhere on the Western Front. Yet some staff officers also exercised command functions and perhaps therefore warrant some of this reflected criticism.

The staffs reputation has not been helped by the difficulty many commentators on the war have had with the wide range of ranks and roles that are caught up in the description 'Staff'. The numbers of officers who could be classified as staff was not large. In 1918, the AIF included some 9411 officers (including those with honorary rank).⁶ Of this number, slightly fewer than 500 could be defined as having some staff responsibilities in connection with operations involving Australian troops on the Western Front. That number needs to be treated with considerable caution as it is entirely dependent on how a staff officer is defined. While the broadest possible interpretation has been used it does not include the Middle East contingent or AIF troops in Australia. It does include depot staffs in the United Kingdom and individuals who commanded formations of brigade size and above. It still represents a small proportion, about six per cent, of the total officer corps.

If the narrower definition of officers who planned and directed operations is used, the number shrinks even further. One paper that does examine the Australian Staff, Peter Stanley's work on the 'G' staff, identified around 150 officers, not including trainees, who served in this capacity between 1916 and 1918.⁷

If the definition of a staff officer defies generalisation, what of the duties they carried out? All purely 'staff' functions fall into three categories, known until recently in the Australian Army by the letters 'G', 'A' and 'Q'. The first of these, the 'G' staff, had the 'glamour' role of operational planning, the 'A' or administrative staff dealt with the personnel function and 'Q', or Quartermaster, was concerned with all matters of supply. Although intelligence was always the province of the 'G' staff, this was formalised during the war by the establishment of a specific 'G' officer position for intelligence. The 'A' and 'Q' functions were often considered complementary areas of responsibilities and at some command levels were discharged by the same individual. There was also a host of specialist appointments that evolved during the War that had no pre-war equivalents and that did not fit neatly into any of these three categories.

The staff structure of 1918 was complex but had a clear logic to its construction. It is impossible to evaluate the contribution of the staff officer in isolation from an understanding of the organisation in which he worked. As the AIF was never formed into a national Army, despite considerable efforts by some to achieve such a distinction, the staff structure of an Army level command will not be considered. At the highest level of command of Empire forces in France, Sir Douglas Haig's GHQ, no Australian staff officers featured, so the structure of this Headquarters is also not addressed. Nor, despite their being included in the numbers mentioned earlier, are the staff employed at Headquarters in the United Kingdom considered further.

In the structure of a 1918 British pattern army, the Brigade was the smallest formation with a formal staff structure. Lower level formations such as Battalions did have officers, for example Adjutants, whose duties had many of the appearances of staff duties. For routine minor operations, particularly small trench raids, responsibility was often delegated even further, to the commanders of the Company or Platoon conducting the mission. However, on this limited, uncomplicated scale, planning and coordination were accepted as a normal part of the commander's responsibilities.

The Brigade was arguably the smallest distinguishable combat element engaged on the Western Front. The Brigade structure in the AIF underwent a profound change in 1918, when the number of its Infantry Battalions was reduced from four to three. Before 1918, a Brigade would have fielded about 4200 men including, in addition to the infantry battalions, its organic Light Trench Mortar Company (of about 50 personnel) and, until grouped together at Divisional level, its Machine Gun Company. After the reorganisation, the authorised Brigade strength was reduced by 1000, but declining reinforcements usually meant a much lower actual strength.

To plan the activities of this force, the Brigade Commander, usually a Brigadier or senior Colonel, was assisted by two officers, one Major, who was known as the Brigade Major or BM, and a Staff Captain. In addition, Brigade Headquarters often had attached officers learning the basics of staff work.

**Headquarters, Australian Army Corps
(October 1918)**

<i>Appointment</i>	<i>Name</i>
Commander	Maj-Gen (temp Lt-Gen) Sir J Monash, KCB, VD, AIF
ADC to Commander	Capt AM Moss, AIF
ADC to Commander	Capt PW Simonson, AIF
 <i>GS Branch</i>	
BGGS	Col (temp Brig-Gen) TA Blamey, CMG, DSO, AIF, psc
GSO2	Lt-Col SL Milligan ,CMG, DSO, MC, AIF
GSO2	Major RG Casey, DSO, MC, AIF
GSO2	Capt (temp Major) SA Hunn, MC, AIF
GSO3	Capt JD Rogers, MC, AIF
 <i>A & Q Branch</i>	
DA & QMG	Col (temp Brig-Gen) RA Carruthers, CB, CMG, Ind Army
AQMG	Lt-Col GC Sommerville, CMG, DSO, AIF
DAAG	Major FK Officer, MC, AIF
DAQMG	Major, EO Milne, DSO, AIF
Staff Capt	Capt RCA Anderson, AIF
 <i>Admin Secs and Depts</i>	
AD Signals	Lt-Col TR Williams, DSO, AIF
DAD Roads	Lt (temp Major) G Davy, MC, RE (TF)
Lab Comdt	Lt-Col (temp Col) AD Acland, TF Res
Asst to Lab Comdt	Temp Capt F Harrison, Gen List
DDMS	Col GW Barber, CMG, DSO, AAMC, AIF
DADMS	Major AJ Collins, DSO, MC, AAMC, AIF
ADOS	Lt-Col ET Leane, AIF
ADVS	Lt-Col T Matson, DSO, AAVC, AIF
DADAPS	Lt (temp Capt) CJ Fletcher, AIF
 <i>Spec Appointment</i>	
APM Camp Commdt	Major WW Berry, AIF
MG Officer	Major EA Wilton, DSO, AIF
 <i>HQ Artillery of the Corps</i>	
Commander	Col (temp Brig-Gen) WA Coxen, CMG, DSO, AIF
GSO2	Lt-Col HDK Macartney, DSO AIF
Staff Capt	Capt EJ Chenery, MC, AIF
SO for Reconnaissance	Capt HB Sewell, MC, AIF
Lt-Col RA attached for Counter Battery Work	Major (temp Lt-Col) EJ Cummins, DSO, RGA
 <i>HQ Divinl Engineers</i>	
Commander	Lt-Col WA Henderson, DSO, AIF
Adjt	Capt BS Dowling, MC, AIF

The BM's role was to plan the Brigade's operations, usually within a larger operation involving Divisional and often Corps troops. The Brigade Major's principal task was to interpret the commands from higher headquarters and transform them into precise instructions and specific actions for each of the Brigade's combat elements. He also advised the Brigade Commander on all matters relating to the fighting efficiency of the Brigade. It was at this level that the minor tactical planning for the battle was undertaken. Within the limits set by the overall plan, it was the BM who advised his Brigadier on the local objectives that should be achieved and who coordinated the unit actions and tactics necessary to secure them. He coordinated any artillery and/or trench mortar support that was made available and usually provided the liaison with adjoining formations.

The ability of the Brigade Major was a key factor in a Brigade's combat effectiveness. Ideally, he would have been a senior major of much battle experience. In October 1918, in a reflection of the intensity of the fighting in which the AIF had been involved, only eight of the 15 Infantry Brigade BMs in the Australian Corps were majors, and all except one of these had been a major for 12 months or less. The remainder were captains. While they were all also very young, with only two of the captains and none of the majors older than 30, and seven were 25 or younger, they had all had recent combat experience with battalions. Only four did not hold the Military Cross and of these George Vasey of 11 Brigade had the DSO instead. Although holding key planning responsibilities, none held the *psc* qualification.

The other key member of the Brigade staff was the Staff Captain. If the BM fulfilled the 'G' function for the Brigade, the Staff Captain had both the 'A' and the 'Q' role. It was his responsibility to ensure the Brigade was adequately equipped and supplied, up to the required strength in manpower and generally well administered. In operational planning, he was responsible for controlling and coordinating arrangements with the support services within the Brigade area. Medical evacuation routes, POW and straggler collection and resupply are examples of the matters for which he was directly responsible.

Much of the cartoon humour directed against staff officers uses the theme of rear echelon 'Q' staff, safe in their luxurious chateaux, asking ridiculous questions about requests for stores and equipment. Clearly, this does not apply to the Staff Captain of the Brigade staff. Unlike their BMs, only two of the Staff Captains in October 1918 did not hold the MC, and these two were newly arrived and had had no combat experience. While most Staff Captains tended to be older than their BM superiors (one was nearly 40), they appear to have been Captains for, on average, one and a half to two years. All had service in battalions and some were promoted from the ranks. It is clearly unlikely that, apart from the two new arrivals, this group would have been unaware of the conditions under which their troops were operating.

There was usually a third officer on the Headquarters strength, known as the Orderly Officer who was, in effect, the staff trainee. The brigade also had a veterinary officer permanently attached while towards the end of the War a Brigade Intelligence Officer starts to appear in the War Diaries, with 12 Officers identified as Brigade Intelligence officers in the Gradation Lists of October 1918. The Divisional Artillery Brigade also had a specialist officer, known as the Staff Officer for Reconnaissance, who was the Brigade's specialist Intelligence Officer.

Missing from this list are the several specialist officers taken on the Brigade staff to advise the Commander on specific subjects. These could include, by the end of the War, the Brigade Bombing Officer, Gas Officer, Musketry Officer and the Trench Mortar Officer, who also commanded the Light Trench Mortar Company. They also had responsibilities for training in their particular specialities. While all brigades employed officers in these roles, they were never an official part of the Brigade Headquarters and usually accepted these responsibilities in addition to other duties. In 1918, over 30 officers appear on Brigade staff strengths, mainly as musketry and bombing officers.

Three Infantry Brigades, together of course with divisional troops such as the engineer element, the Artillery Brigade and the medical and service elements, combined to make up a Division. At the beginning of the war, it would have had a strength of around 20,000 men but for some divisions in 1918, this number had shrunk to around 12,000. While the Division was the primary combat organisation of all armies on the Western Front, combat strength varied considerably between Divisions.

To plan and manage such a large force required a larger staff. Traditionally, Great War Divisions had 19 approved staff positions, as the diagram of the 1st Division shows. In practice, there were invariably several additional officers on the strength, either supernumerary or as 'staff learners'.

The three staff of the General Staff Branch were the divisional equivalent of the Brigade Major, having major responsibility for planning and managing the Division in action. The senior 'G' staff officer, known as the GSO1 was a Lieutenant Colonel. His was the responsibility for all planning relating to the combat employment of the Division. He was the main point of contact between higher and lower level Headquarters and with Headquarters of other formations. Unlike the Brigade Major, the GSO1 was not solely responsible for coordinating the supporting arms such as artillery or the engineers.

The GSO2, usually a Major, was responsible for the actual drafting and distribution of orders, monitoring the battle efficiency of the Division and preparing all correspondence relating to the Division's operations. The third G Staff Officer, the GSO3, was usually a Captain. By 1918, the GSO3 had formally become the Divisional Intelligence Officer. Given the crushing burden of responsibilities this small team bore, it was quite common to have an additional Captain appointed to assist the GSO2.

The Divisional 'G' staff of 1918 was significantly different in character from the Brigade Staff serving under its orders. Of the five GSO1s, all had spent more of the war in staff positions than in command of troops and all five were regular officers. Those two points were not coincidental, but reflective of the critical shortage of trained officers available to fill senior staff positions. Although all were regulars, only JD Lavarack was *psc*. All of them had battle experience, mostly on Gallipoli, and all had won bravery awards. In contrast to the battle-caused rapid promotion through the ranks that was common in the rest of the army, three of these five had been in their staff position for more than 18 months.

Of the five GSO2s, three had been in their position since February 1917. Like their immediate superiors, all except one had combat experience and been decorated for bravery. Major EF Harrison of the Third Division, who was the one without battle experience, was the only one with the *psc* qualification. He had come from an instructor's position in Australia. His arrival also raised the average age of the group, as he was ten years older than the others.

It is illustrative of the functioning of a modern army that while operational planning was the responsibility of four officers, eight staff positions were necessary to administer and supply the Division. The 'A' and 'Q' function still came under the oversight of one individual, the Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General (AA&QMG). A Lieutenant-Colonel, the AA&QMG was responsible for all personnel and ordnance matters, including administrative responsibility for the medical services. The daily demands of a combat division were so extensive that he required two senior staff in support, one for each area of responsibility. The Deputy Assistant Adjutant General (DAAG) had particular responsibility for discipline, POWs, personnel administrative matters such as leave, casualties, reinforcements, working parties and fatigues, cookery and (with the Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal) police matters and traffic control. His equivalent on the supply side of the staff was the Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General (DAQMG) whose principal responsibility was the provision of supplies of all kinds. He was responsible also for the provision of maps, supervision of all movements and transport and had oversight of the veterinary care of the significant number of animals required by an Infantry Division.

Separate from these staff officers but working closely with them were the heads of specialist services or Departments. Each of them was considered to be part of the staff as they all had major input to the Divisional planning process. The most prominent was the Assistant Director of Medical Services (ADMS). Frequently senior in rank to all the other members of the staff, the ADMS had a role beyond caring for the sick and wounded. He worked closely with the AA&QMG to protect the physical and mental well-being of all the troops in the Division. Matters of sanitation were his responsibility. The Deputy Assistant Director Veterinary Services had similar responsibilities for the Division's animals.

While DAQMG was the Division's supply staff officer, he worked closely with several other departments and specialists. Chief among these was an organisation known as the Divisional Train. This was a large unit, usually commanded by a Lieutenant-Colonel, and was responsible for the movement of supplies and stores between major distribution points to the Division. While Divisional Train was a Divisional Unit, its Commanding Officer is not included on the Divisional Staff. Advice on supply was channelled from the Train into the planning process via DAQMG. One key supply officer who was shown on the Divisional staff strength was the Deputy Assistant Director Ordnance Services (DADOS). This officer was responsible for the supply, maintenance and replacement of all equipment in use in the Division. While most of the Division's clothing and rifle requirements were sourced from Australia, the British supplied everything else, DADOS had therefore to develop a good understanding of, and maintain close links with, the British Army 'Q' system.

The interesting observation to be drawn about this class of staff officer is, once again, the large number with prior combat experience. If gallantry awards serve any analytical purpose, it is as a pointer to the recipient's exposure to the front line. In the five Divisional A&Q Branches, eight officers held DSOs and five held MCs, demonstrating that 13 out of a possible 15 had some experience of combat at some stage in their careers. For many of the more senior specialist A&Q staff, this experience was most likely gained on Gallipoli.

All five AA&QMG were regular officers, members of the prewar Administrative and Instructional Staff. All were considerably older than their 'G' staff equivalents. The youngest, RE Jackson, AA&QMG for the Third Division was born in 1886 while the oldest, R Dowse of the Fourth Division, was born in 1866. The age and experience of this group, in obvious contrast with their staff colleagues, probably contributed to the trench humour depiction of the staff as both overage and overly concerned with paperwork.

The GOC of the Division had two Aides-de-Camp. Contrary to some front line opinions, they occupied positions of some responsibility. The senior ADC was the 'Camp Commandant' for the Headquarters staff while the other was the private secretary and personal assistant for the GOC. The progression of former ADCs through the ranks is most spectacularly illustrated by the illustrious career of one RG Casey, who started out in 1914 as an Honorary Lieutenant in the Automobile Corps moved to be ADC to the GOC 1 Div and up through the 'G' staff structure before retiring, many years later, as Governor-General of Australia.

There were two other officers on the staff of the Division whose positions were unlike the others. The Commander of the Divisional Artillery, known as Commander Royal Artillery or CRA, was the senior gunner of the formation. Usually a Brigadier, CRA was responsible for all aspects of the employment and development of the Division's organic artillery. He prepared the fire plan with which the guns would support the infantry in attack and defence. He coordinated the artillery of other formations assisting the Division and liaised with other formations when his guns were supporting them and he was responsible for the training and professional development of the gunners. He frequently commanded the Division in the absence of the GOC. Consequently, the CRA exercised both a staff and a command function.

The Commander Royal Engineers, or CRE, was usually a Lieutenant-Colonel and was responsible both for commanding the specialist engineer troops attached to the Division and for providing specialist engineering advice to the Divisional Commander. CRE also provided the Division's communications through the Divisional Signals Unit, which was an engineer unit in 1918. As with the CRA, CRE worked closely with the 'G' staff in operational planning.

Both these groups of specialists had front line experience similar to their staff colleagues. The CRAs and CREs of all five divisions had had prior combat experience. All had commanded a combat unit and most had DSOs. The Military Cross was a common decoration among their subordinates.

Like the Brigade, the Division had a large number of specialist officers who provided advice on a range of specific topics. They were not regarded as part of the Headquarters staff but did carry considerable responsibilities. At the Divisional level, more of these specialists were

concerned with support and rear area activities than with the Brigades. They ranged from specialist Traffic Control Officers, through the Divisional Claims Officer and Salvage Officer to the Divisional Courts-Martial Officer. The Gas Officer at Divisional level was sometimes called the Divisional Chemical Adviser. There were also the usual weapons experts such as the Medium and Heavy Trench Mortar Officers and the Machine-Gun Officer.

1st Australian Infantry Brigade (October 1918)

Appointment	Name
Commander	Lt-Col (temp Brig-Gen) IG Mackay, DSO, AIF
Bde-Major	Capt RR Agnew, AIF
Staff Capt	Capt R Hall, MC AIF

While many Australian staff were employed in Headquarters in the rear areas and in the UK, the highest level Australian Headquarters controlling combat troops was the Australian Corps. A Corps was a flexible formation of two or more Divisions plus Corps troops. Corps were the main combat elements of the Western Front. As such, the planning task was significantly more demanding than at divisional level. This was reflected in the staff structure of the Corps Headquarters.

The principal Corps planner and chief of staff of the Corps Headquarters was the Brigadier General General Staff, or BGGGS. His duties were broadly the same as those of the Divisional GSO1, just far more complex. He was assisted by a somewhat larger team of 'G' staff officers. Of increased importance was the intelligence function, while responsibility for training and skill standards was lessened with the increased distance from the troops. While the planning responsibility became more complex and demanding, there was no increase in the number of *psc* qualified staff on the Australian Corps Headquarters. Only the BGGGS, TA Blamey, was a staff college graduate. However, most of the staff, on both the 'G' and the 'A&Q' sides, had had prior staff experience. Despite the distance between the Corps Headquarters and the fighting units, there is no diminution in the indicators of combat experience with the staff. All three junior GSOs (including RG Casey) had Military Crosses.

The 'A' and 'Q' staff also shared duties broadly similar to their Divisional counterparts but on a more extensive and complex level. Interestingly, it is on the 'A&Q' side that the first non-AIF (or honorary AIF) officer is encountered—in marked contrast to two years earlier. RA Carruthers, DA&QMG of the Australian Corps, was an Indian Army Officer who came to the AIF with Birdwood in 1915. At this level, a British Officer would have been an advantage, for it was here that the Australian supply system interfaced with the British network.⁸

The Corps had one other group of staff who were a key element in operational planning. As understanding and appreciation of the power of modern massed artillery increased, heavier calibres of artillery tended to be grouped together at Corps level. Specialist artillery officers, including some of the remaining few non-Australians on the staff, appeared on Corps headquarters strengths to plan and control the application of this operationally critical force multiplier.

The only other non-Australians left in the Corps were some specialist engineers at Corps headquarters. The process of 'Australianisation' of the staff throughout the Corps was virtually complete, even if it did mean employing staff with limited experience.

Conclusion

The staff in 1918 operated in a simple yet effective and flexible structure. It was a structure that enabled and encouraged the essential interaction between planners and specialists so necessary to ensure operational success. It also shows that the staff of the Australian Corps in 1918, with a few exceptions, possessed the backgrounds and experience needed by planners in the changing tactical and technological environment of the Western Front. Whether their efforts were effective because of this experience or, indeed, whether they were any more efficient at the individual level in 1918 than were their colleagues of two years earlier, is a question that lies beyond the scope of this essay.

Before these conclusions can be drawn with any confidence, there are a number of key factors that had a profound influence on the staff that need analysis. The impact of the expansion of the AIF had a profound impact on the nature and character of the staff. The influx of Indian Army officers with Birdwood, absolutely necessary due to the lack of suitable staff within the AIF at the time, led to an imbalance in the development of AIF officers. AIF Headquarters favoured Australians in the administrative staff because, as Major-General Gordon Legge noted when taking command of the newly formed Second Division, 'Australian experience was more needed on the AA&QMG side because it dealt with personnel administration, a matter of keen concern to both the troops and the Australian Government'.⁹ This desire to ensure only Australians administered Australians left the 'G' function a heavily British officered organisation until 1917. There is as yet no evidence to prove whether this was or was not to the detriment of the AIF.

What can be said, however, is that by 1918, sufficient evidence exists of the diversity of experience of the staff at all levels of the command structure of the Australian Corps to render unconvincing the popular stereotype of the 'staff as universally ignorant and unconcerned for their colleagues in the front line.

Endnotes

1. General Sir John Monash, *The Australian victories in France in 1918* (London Hutchinson, 1920), 294.
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3. Monash, *Australian victories*, 295.
4. AGS Enser, *A Subject Bibliography of the First World*, 2nd edn (Aldershot: Cower, 1990).
5. *Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Papers*, 1903 Session, vol II no 37, Annual Report Upon the Military Forces of the Commonwealth for the Period January, 1902-30th April, 1903'.
6. Australian Imperial Force, *Gradation List of Officers, October 1918* (Melbourne: Government Printer, 1918).
7. Peter Stanley, 'Paul the Pimp re-considered: Australian "G" staffs on the western front and the "Kiggell" anecdote', unpublished paper presented to the Australian War Memorial History Conference, July 1987, 7.
8. BD Faraday, 'Half the Battle: The Administration and higher Organisation of the AIF 1914-1918', PhD thesis, UNSW ADFA, 1997, 189.
9. David Horner, *Blamey, The Commander-in-Chief* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1998), 38.