The Battle of El Alamein

The Battle of El Alamein, from 23 October to 5 November 1942, was one of the largest battles involving the western allies in the whole of the war with Germany. El Alamein was part of the series of battles that saw the British Commonwealth forces advancing and retreating across the coastal plain and desert hinterland of North Africa from 1940 to 1943. The prize for the Axis (German and Italian forces under the command of the German general, Erwin Rommel) was Egypt and the Suez Canal. The destruction of the Axis forces in the Theatre was the focus of Allied operations. El Alamein was, in effect the closest the Axis came to achieving their goal. Once that battle was over, the Axis forces were in continual retreat until finally destroyed, in Tunisia on 11 May 1943, by the westward advancing 8th Army and the Allied Forces coming east from the Torch Landings.

While perhaps too much has been made of the battle of El Alamein – including such clearly jingoistic assessments that it was the turning point in the war – the battle was very important for a number of reasons. It was the battle that reignited Bernard Montgomery’s career, with him eventually rising to the highest rank in the British Army and to command Allied land forces in the D-Day landings. It was an early rehearsal for the type of joint operations that were to become standard allied operating procedures in north west Europe following the D-Day invasion. Furthermore, it was the first large-scale battle fought by a British Army in the desert in which all elements in the Army fought to the same plan and same timetable, as a co-ordinated force. Ironically, in many ways, the battle was more reminiscent of the large scale, set piece battles of the First World War than it was of the fast moving, complex armoured manoeuvring that is the popular image of World War Two operations.

El Alamein was a large battle, involving 220,000 men, 1,100 tanks and 900 guns on the Allied side facing the 180,000 men, 600 tanks and 500 guns of the Axis powers. Australia’s involvement was one Division, the 9th, a part of the British 30th Corps. Famous for its defence of Tobruk, the Division had again played a part in halting then throwing back the advancing Afrika Korps in the months preceding El Alamein. In the battle itself, the 9th Division was to play a pivotal role.

Montgomery’s plan was based on his superiority in resources, both men and material. He planned a number of deliberate moves that the enemy could not ignore and would be forced respond to, thus exposing himself to superior artillery fire and fire from other, deliberately sited defensive positions. Infantry were to push forward and clear paths through the enemy’s defensive minefields, through which armoured forces would be introduced into the enemy’s rear areas. Monty believed the enemy would initially use his infantry to respond and they would be ‘crumbled away’ by superior allied firepower. He also believed the move of his armour through these corridors would then force the Axis armour forward to meet the same fate. The main assault, by 30th Corps, was to occur from the right hand, or northern, end of the allied line along the coastal plain. Other, lesser attacks by other Corps were to occur further south in the desert proper. The Australian objective was, with the other three Divisions in the Corps, to drive a large blunt wedge through the enemy lines 5.5 kilometres deep and 14 kilometres wide. These objectives had to be achieved between the start of the attack at 10.00 pm and 3.00 am the next day.

As usual, things did not go as planned. The enemy’s line was breached, but not enough of the minefields were cleared to allow the armoured forces to sortie through the infantry. The Axis were able to build new defensive positions in front of the new allied positions and the process had to be done all over again. Montgomery withdrew his armour and used his infantry almost as the ‘bait’ to draw out the Axis armour. While this was a successful ploy and eventually the enemy’s armoured formations were savaged, the Allied Infantry paid a high price.

Unfortunately for the Australians, they had succeeded too well in their initial advances. They successfully seized the high ground around a point known as Trig 29. From here, after beating off a fierce counter attack by the German 15th Armoured Division, they were turned north. This move threatened to cut off the German 164th Division which had been bypassed by 30 Corps advance and was trapped against the Mediterranean Sea.

Recognising this threat, Rommel threw his whole armoured force against the Australian positions. For five days the fighting raged around Trig 29 and involved some of the most severe fighting the Australians had yet experienced. However, by drawing the weight of Rommel’s forces onto them, the 9th Division enabled Montgomery to employ his armoured spearhead against weakened positions further south, eventually forcing a way through.

Faced with encirclement, Rommel had no option but to withdraw, eventually to the Tunisian border. The price paid was high, with Allied forces casualties of 13,000 for the battle. Reflecting the intensity of the battle for Trig 29, the 9th Division suffered 5,800 casualties during the battle.

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