THE KOKODA CAMPAIGN
JULY 1942

See also: WW2 - SW Pacific 1941-2; Images of WW2

Strategic Overview

The campaign fought in the Owen Stanley Ranges in 1942 resulted from the failure of a previous attempt by the Japanese to capture Port Moresby. This had been a planned amphibious assault, but was thwarted by the Battles of the Coral Sea on (5-8th May 1942) and Midway (4-6th June 1942). The Japanese consequently decided to make a two-pronged attack on Port Moresby – one, over the Owen Stanley Range from the north, and the other from Milne Bay.


Pic: Australian War Memorial
Eora Creek, Papua, 1942-11. The first crossing of Eora Creek on a section of the Kokoda Trail from Myola.
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The Kokoda Track or Trail is a muddy foot track, about 100 miles in length, that climbs the Owen Stanley Range and connects the north coast of Papua with Port Moresby on the south coast. The country is extremely rough, with little or no existing infra-structure and an enervating and malarious climate. The village of Kokoda lies on a small plateau on the north-east slopes of the Owen Stanley Range. In 1942 its strategic value lay in the existence of a small air-strip.

Operational Overview

The much better trained and equipped Australian Imperial Force was overseas when Japan and Australia found themselves at war. The responsibility for the defence of New Guinea, and ultimately Australia, therefore fell initially on the poorly-trained and ill-equipped troops of the militia.

Despite there being considerable warnings throughout the early half of 1942 of the Japanese intentions to attack Port Moresby, in January 1942 only one militia brigade was sent to its defence – the 39th. Some of its members were sent overseas without warning, and some had never fired their rifles. Nor were they trained or given the opportunity to prepare to meet the Japanese when they arrived – most of their time in Port Moresby was spent labouring. Yet these were the troops who were to confront the well- equipped and previously unbeaten Japanese, veterans of the fighting in China, Malaya and the Philippines, in the jungles of New Guinea.

The Japanese began bombing Port Moresby in February 1942. On 8th March they landed troops at Lae and Salamaua. They greatly outnumbered the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles (NGVR) who opposed them - after a skirmish the NGVR withdrew into the jungle from where they kept the Japanese under close surveillance. It was not until May, 1942, that reinforcements were finally sent to Port Moresby. But despite the fact that there were now veteran AIF brigades available in Australia, the brigade sent was a militia brigade - the 14th. Australia was therefore sending members of one of its lowest graded brigades into ‘some of the most difficult country in the world’ to confront ‘some of the best equipped and most experienced troops.’

One of the important elements of the campaign was logistics. With only 1 or 2 transport aircraft available, the only alternative was native bearers. A bearer could carry enough food for 1 man for 13 days – with Kokoda an 8 day march away, a bearer would consume most of his load in transit. And food was only one of the many supplies essential to the campaign.

Another was the support of the natives. Many of the Papuan Infantry Battalion took to the bush as the Japanese closed, but some loyal members continued to patrol, collecting information and killing Japanese or the natives who sided with them. Other natives toiled under immense difficulties to supply the forward troops, and to carry out some of their wounded. The latter were faced with a gruelling 8-12 day march in terrible conditions.

Organisations such as ANGAU - Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit – also played a vital role. ANGAU was raised from resident whites, and their knowledge of the country and the locals was invaluable.

The Australian and United States’ Air Forces bombed the Japanese beachhead at Gona-Buna, with high losses and minimal gains. The High Command in Australia had little or no concept of the desperate fighting in Papua, and even when reinforcements were sent, the Kokoda Track ensured that it would take days for them to join the fighting. The Japanese had known no failure in their advances in the Pacific, and were first opposed in Papua the Victorian 39th Militia Battalion, whose average age was 18yrs 6 months. It was a bleak time for the Allied forces.

The Battle

On 6th and 7th July, 1942, some 300 men of the Papuan Infantry Battalion (PIB) and “B” company of the 39th Militia Battalion - known as Maroubra Force - were sent to prevent the Japanese moving over the Owen Stanley Ranges. The Japanese began landing in the Buna-Gona area on 21st July. On 23rd July, another of company of the 39th Battalion, “C” Company, began moving towards Kokoda.

On the afternoon of 23rd July, a platoon of “B” Company of the 39th and some Papuans first met the Japanese, who were moving south from the Gona-Buna area; the engagement took place near Awala, about mid-way between Kokoda and Buna. A patrol under LT Chalk of Angau opened rifle fire on the advancing Japanese, who replied with machine guns, mortars and a mountain gun. LT Seekamp’s platoon of 39th Battalion was ordered to hold the enemy for 30 minutes while the PIB established defences further back. One estimate stated that in this first clash approximately 100 Australian troops were facing about 2000 Japanese.

The few remaining PIB – many had deserted – under MAJ Watson and Seekamp’s platoon of the 39th Battalion destroyed the Wairopi Bridge, and, as the strength of the Japanese was now known, were ordered to only fight rearguard actions and to withdraw to Kokoda.

As the Japanese advanced they were ambushed by another platoon of the 39th – it was the Australian platoon’s first sight of the enemy, yet they displayed good combat discipline in holding fire while the Japanese deployed and re-formed before them. About 15 Japanese were shot, then the Australians fell back to Oivi.

With only one company to face the enemy, the CO of the 39th Battalion, LTCOL WT Owen, requested two companies be flown forward to Kokoda – he received only 1 platoon, in 2 widely separated flights.

The Australians at Oivi were attacked and were soon surrounded. CAPT Templeton went back along the track to warn the platoons coming forward to be wary of the ambush, but was never seen again. He was captured and killed by the Japanese. The troops at Oivi were withdrawn – some fought their way out, others slipped into the jungle and managed to find their way around the Japanese. Nearby a group of Europeans, including women, and PIB were captured and killed by the Japanese and natives.

COL Owen destroyed the supplies at Kokoda and re-formed at Deniki. However, when he discovered that the Japanese had not occupied Kokoda, he took his 77 exhausted men forward and re-occupied it. The Japanese attacked at 2am on July 29th, and met fierce resistance - one estimate suggests that Kokoda was defended by about 80 Australians, against about 2000 attacking Japanese. During the fighting COL Owen received a mortal wound in the head while throwing a grenade.

The end of the one-sided battle was inevitable, and the Australians managed to extricate themselves once more. The CO, now MAJ Watson of the PIB, and other officers, including the Medical Officer, a First World War veteran, brought up the rear. Two militia privates waited in Kokoda until the Japanese were almost on top of them, and shot about 15 before withdrawing. In the next few days the remaining companies of the 39th Battalion joined Maroubra Force, but the Australians were still greatly outnumbered by the Japanese.

“B” Company of the 39th Battalion had fought well. They had been forced to learn as they fought, many of their lessons in jungle fighting coming from the enemy. The Japanese were using tactics tried and proved in Malaya - when they met opposition, they immediately attempted to outflank it and cut it off. They used their artillery and mortars, of which the Australians had none, to good effect. They crawled along beneath the undergrowth to attack and climbed trees to snipe. The Australian forces retaliated but were forced to adopt a pattern of conducting fighting withdrawals – fight, stop the enemy, then withdraw before being annihilated.


Major Players and Units

MAJ-GEN Tomitaro Horii - Commander South Seas Force
GEN Douglas MacArthur - Supreme Allied Commander, South-West Pacific Area
GEN Thomas Blamey - Commander Allied Ground Forces, South-West Pacific Area
LTCOL WT Owen

Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit
New Guinea Volunteer Rifles
Papuan Infantry Battalion
Australian 14th Brigade
Australian 30th Brigade – 39th, 49th and 53rd Australian Militia Battalions

South Seas Force/Detachment (Japan):

144 Infantry Regiment (3 battalions plus regimental troops)
55 Mountain Artillery Battalion
15 Independent Engineer Regiment
55 Engineer Regiment (part)
plus anti-aircraft, supply, signals, medical, cargo-handling, hygiene and other units
Later Fighting on the Kokoda Track

Even after its remaining companies joined it, the 39th Battalion could muster only 460 men; the Papuan battalion was down to 43.

On 6th August Major AG Cameron arrived to take command and attempted to retake Kokoda on the 8th. One company managed to occupy Kokoda, but heavy casualties forced a withdrawal to Deniki on the 9th. Between the 9th and 14th August, the Australians repulsed a number of enemy attacks; but with food and ammunition running low, the exhausted defenders withdrew to Isurava on the night of 14/15 August.

Australia meanwhile had despatched the 7th Division to New Guinea – its 21st Bde was to reinforce Port Moresby, and the 18th Milne Bay. LT-GEN Sidney Rowell took command at Port Moresby on 12th Aug; Brig SHWC Porter of the 30th Bde went forward to take command in the Owen Stanleys and LTCOL Ralph Honner to take command of the 39th Battalion, which was now being joined by the 53rd Battalion. By now GEN Horii had approximately 13,500 men under his command, of whom 10,000 were fighting troops. The battered remains of the 39th Battalion, hearing reinforcements were on the way, determined to hold out.

On 23rd August, Brig Arnold Potts of the 21st Bde AIF arrived at Isurava. The Japanese attacks continued for the next 2 days ‘with an awesome fury…as GEN Horii committed his superior numbers and firepower against [Honner’s] desperate defenders.’ On the 26th August the first parties of Pott’s 2/14th and 2/16th Infantry Battalions began arriving. The survivors of the 39th Battalion, who had been promised relief for a week, were then being attacked by 4 battalions of Japanese, and decided to stay and assist the AIF. The men of the 2/14th were surprised that troops in such a ragged condition were capable of fighting any longer. For their part, the exhausted members of the 39th were awed by the appearance of the 2/14th – they were fit, well-equipped and ready to fight – to the gaunt 39th Battalion they looked like Gods.

Under Brig Potts, the 39th, 2/14th, 2/16th and 53rd Infantry Battalions continued the battle – fighting and covering each other’s withdrawal in the confused fighting. The 53rd was removed from the fight. The fighting withdrawal continued through Alola, Eora Creek, Templeton’s Crossing, Myola and Effogi.

On 5th September the 2/27th Infantry Battalion, after a four day forced march, joined Pott’s force at Mission Ridge, above Efogi and replaced the remnants of the 39th Battalion. It is generally considered that the militiamen of the 39th had fought ‘magnificently.’

The 2/27th, 2/14th and 2/16th Infantry Battalions continued the fight until joined by reinforcements, including the 3rd Militia Battalion, 25th Brigade AIF and others. By now, however, the Japanese assault had been blunted. The long fighting withdrawal, begun by the 39th and Papuan Battalions, and continued under Potts, had gradually lengthened the Japanese’ supply lines, and the attrition of the hard fighting had exhausted them and cost them dearly. The Australians began pushing forward and the Japanese began to be forced back. Kokoda was retaken on 2nd November, and the Allied advance would continue to the northern beaches.

When the 39th were finally withdrawn from the fighting, they were feverish, suffering from scrub typhus, hookworm and malaria; boots and uniforms had rotted through. They had suffered: 54 men were killed in action, four died of wounds and 125 were wounded during their fight along the Kokoda Track. LTCOL Ralph Honner assembled the remains of the 39th Battalion – by now only 50 men, wearing what was left of their uniforms and kit. Honner commended them for their remarkable efforts and passed on Brigadier Pott’s commendations.

Throughout the campaign to date, the High Command in Australia had had little or no idea of the conditions or urgency of the fighting in Papua, and urgent resources such as air transport had been denied. In September, as the Japanese began to withdraw, GEN Blamey proceeded to Port Moresby and unjustly removed LTGEN SF Rowell from command, and on 22nd October sacked Brig Potts. Soon after he also sacked GEN Allen. On 9th November, at Koitaki, Blamey addressed the assembled 21st Brigade, veterans of the middle-east and the jungle fighting on the Kokoda Track. He told them that ‘they had been defeated, that he had been defeated, and that Australia had been defeated…… “Remember, .. it is not the man with the gun that gets shot; it’s the rabbit that is running away.”’ The GEN then addressed the officers separately, stating that ‘they hadn’t led their men properly …and “you’ve got to pull your socks up”.

Port Moresby had been saved by the determination of under-prepared and equipped troops, who had been seriously let down by their high command. Moreover, it is likely GEN Blamey’s words were to have a tragic consequence later.

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© 2004 Dept of Defence