
Tim Dahlstrom

Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies
Australian Defence College
2007

Abstract

This paper argues for the Australian Federal Police’s International Deployment Group to take an equivalent coordinating role, alongside military, diplomatic and aid efforts, for future Australian Peacekeeping operations and conflict prevention strategies. This paper makes three principal recommendations which are particularly salient for the new Australian government to consider as it develops the 2008 Defence White Paper and a Civil-Military Cooperation Centre. These recommendations are: first, the creation of a capstone National Security Strategy Statement; second, a joint security and humanitarian international engagement, liaison and development (SHIELD) centre; and third, it argues for the expansion of the AFP IDG structure to further each of these recommendations.

This document is approximately 9,500 words, excluding its bibliography and abstract. It prints off at 34 pages.
The Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS) is the senior educational institution of the Australian Defence College. It delivers a one year Defence and Strategic Studies Course, a postgraduate level educational program which places emphasis on practical, rather than theoretical research, on teamwork and support for the personal and professional goals of all course members. Course members and staff share a commitment to achieving scholarly and professional excellence, with course members graduating with a Master of Arts awarded by Deakin University or a Graduate Diploma awarded by the CDSS. These papers have been submitted as coursework, and have been chosen for publication based on their scholarly attributes and the timeliness of their topic.

For further information about the CDSS please visit:

© Commonwealth of Australia

This work is copyright. It may be downloaded, displayed, printed and reproduced in unaltered form, including the retention of this notice, for personal, non-commercial use or use for professional purposes. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, all other rights are reserved. To replicate all or part of this document for any purpose other than those stipulated above, contact the CDSS.

Shedden Papers ISSN: 1836-0769

Disclaimer.

This work is the sole opinion of the author, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies, the Department of Defence or the Australian Federal Police. The Commonwealth of Australia will not be legally responsible in contract, tort or otherwise, for any statement made in this publication.

Editing of this essay to make it suitable for publication was undertaken by CDSS Publications Editor, Stephanie Koorey.
About the author

Superintendent Tim Dahlstrom is with the International Deployment Group (IDG) of the Australian Federal Police. The IDG was established in 2004 to manage the overseas deployment of both Australian, and Pacific Island police. Superintendent Dahlstrom graduated from the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies in 2007, with a Master of Arts in Strategic Studies. Superintendent Dahlstrom has served with the Australian Federal Police in Cyprus, East Timor and the Solomon Islands, and been seconded to the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. He has been involved in overseas commitments and operations since 1998 and re-commenced with the IDG in 2006.

Introduction

Traditionally, the focus of governments in conflict operations has been the deployment of military forces in order to establish security and provide an environment in which the rebuilding of the institutions of state can take place. Historically, interventions have been in inter-state conflicts. However, the growing recent trend of intra-state conflict has seen a move away from a military focus, to the provision of basic social needs, most notably the rule of law.

Peacekeeping operations have fundamentally changed as a result, with many operations now involving a ‘whole-of-government’ approach. Increasingly, and in addition to these types of operations, Australia has been involved in its immediate region in deploying resources across a range of state institutions to train, mentor and guide developing countries to build or rebuild an internal capacity for governance. This has raised the importance of the rule of law to achieve stable democratic societies, and the interdependence between national and human security and economic stability, all of which ultimately contribute to quality of life.

The historical participation of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) in peacekeeping operations does not adequately demonstrate the full range of international activities currently undertaken by police, particularly in the areas of capacity-building and regional engagement. The offshore environment in which the AFP now regularly operates is complex, multi-dimensional and dangerous. This shows that the AFP now stands as a functional and vital service alongside, and complementary to, Australian government diplomatic, military and humanitarian operations.

Despite the range of recent experiences in overseas conflict operations and capacity-building initiatives, the AFP, in conjunction with other Australian Government agencies, still remains somewhat stove-piped within the government coordination framework. There is a need to provide a recognised framework for national security strategies involving the expanding range of security providers and humanitarian interagency engagement, liaison and development activities.

The objective of this paper is to provide suggested frameworks for future national security policies relevant to regional and international deployments of Australian resources to conflict operations or preventative capacity-development missions.

This paper makes three principal recommendations which are particularly salient for the new Australian government to consider as it develops the new Defence White
Paper and its Civil-Military Cooperation Centre. First, it argues for a capstone National Security Strategy Statement to be developed under the direction and coordination of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, National Security Division. Second, it suggests that a joint security and humanitarian international engagement, liaison and development (SHIELD) centre is formed within the AFP International Deployment Group (IDG) to provide whole-of-government strategic policy and operational advice and assessments across the range of regional and international state and human security issues. Third, it argues for the expansion of the AFP IDG structure to progress interagency interoperability arrangements for offshore engagement operations.

Implementation of these strategies will improve whole-of-government coordination in addressing current and emerging threats to Australia’s national security and interests through integrating the rule of law and institutional capacity-building initiatives with existing traditional military and diplomatic policy and operational structures.

Australia’s national security and national interest policy framework

Australia’s national security strategy is not supported by a single policy statement but rather through the existence of a number of policies developed by different government departments over time. This framework was supported in practice by the previous government with its sound track record in dealing with matters of national security, international and regional conflict and other emergency situations, such as natural disasters.\(^1\)

The policies which inform this framework come from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Defence, Prime Minister and Cabinet, AusAID and the National Security Committee of Cabinet. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) produced ‘Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign Affairs and Trade Policy Paper’; \(^2\) ‘Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia’; \(^3\) and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Australia’s Role in Fighting Proliferation’. \(^4\)

Complementing the DFAT White Paper, the Department of Defence (hereafter referred to as Defence) has produced a series of White Papers, the most recent being ‘Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force’. \(^5\) Subsequent strategic policy updates were produced in 2003, 2005 and 2007. \(^6\)

---

\(^1\) Australian deployments to East Timor, the Solomon Islands, Afghanistan and Iraq, the response to terrorist bombings directed at Australian interests in Indonesia, as well as disaster responses in Indonesia and Thailand illustrate this record.


\(^3\) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, Australian Government, 2004.


The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) policy paper ‘Protecting Australia against Terrorism - 2006’ is perhaps the most comprehensive policy that draws together non-traditional security threats in Australia. This document clearly articulates the need to build integrated coordination structures across a range of security threats to be effective. Supporting this policy is the National Counter Terrorism Plan (NCTP), also coordinated by PM&C.

In the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) White Paper ‘Aid: Promoting Growth and Stability’, Australia’s aid program is promoted as integral to foreign policy and security strategies through poverty reduction and economic development initiatives.

To coordinate these policies, the Australian Government currently relies on a well-established committee structure led by the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) and supported by the peak departmental heads committee, the Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCNS).

Additional coordination of policy arrangements and focus is brought about through the senior executive officer’s Senior Policy Coordination Group (SPCG) often supported by various individual department and agency policy teams that are ultimately responsible for drafting submissions.

Much of the policy development for government takes place within relevant departments and agencies, either independent of other stakeholder contribution or through interdepartmental consultation. Often this takes the form of specific requirements for functional activity and not in the form of a publicly debatable assessment.

In the national security arena, this form of policy development falls under the close scrutiny of the National Security Division (NSD) of PM&C. In this role, NSD provides the coordination and assessment of longer term strategic policy planning to ensure whole-of-government objectives are met.

**Strategic policy development in Australia**

The Australian Government’s Office of National Assessments (ONA) was established in 1977 as an independent body responsible for the provision of international political, strategic and economic assessments directly to the Prime Minister, senior ministers and the NSC.

ONA draws on all sources of information ranging from closed source intelligence

---

9 For example, the Department of Health was invited into the discussions when Avian Flu was first considered a security threat.
and diplomatic reporting through to open source public information including media and academia. Working closely with DFAT and Defence, ONA produces regular assessments on significant national security matters including international crises and major overseas developments of concern to the national interest.\textsuperscript{10}

Two key features of the ONA limit strategic planning in a holistic sense. Whilst the organisation draws upon all sources, assessments are only produced to the Prime Minister, senior ministers and the NSC. The organisation is precluded from publishing work in the unclassified domain for critical comment by other public and private sector analysts. Secondly, despite the impact on strategic policy development that an ONA assessment may have, ONA does not actually contribute recommendations on policy itself.

In addition, in 2001 the Australian government identified the need for alternative policy advice relating to defence and security issues. As a result, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) was formed as a government owned, but operationally independent and impartial organisation, tasked with making inputs into policy development.

To foster its independence, the organisation was incorporated under the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 and the appointment of a CEO and other Directors was approved. Funding for ASPI is subsidised by the Commonwealth through Defence, although in recent years ASPI has sought to expand its revenue base through commissioned research projects, sponsorship, attendance fees at public events and membership subscription fees, particularly for online publications.\textsuperscript{11}

ASPI’s stated aim is to contribute fresh ideas to government decisions, and to inform public discussion on strategic and defence issues. The scope of its work covers Australia’s strategic policy environment with a strong focus on Defence.\textsuperscript{12}

Despite being a Commonwealth-funded organisation, ASPI’s success in influencing defence policy lies in the independent and public nature of assessments and commentary published. In achieving this, ASPI is able to draw upon external academic and professional sources in order to promote public debate and maintain bipartisan political support for its activities, unlike the government-only service provided by the ONA.

However, despite the existence of these policies, development frameworks and governance structures, there is a demonstrable a gap in Australia’s strategic security


\textsuperscript{12} Australian Strategic Policy Institute, \textit{Better Strategic Decisions for Australia}. 
policy thinking in relation to the current and future environment.

There is a wide body of work acknowledging the impact of non-traditional security threats to national security and the national interest. These threats are also clearly articulated in the key security policy documents outlined previously. However, although articulating these threats in the policy statements other threats such as transnational crime, threats to human security from social disorder and disadvantage, and underscoring the core tenet of the rule of law as a basis for strong democratic governance, remain outside the strategic policy framework as stand-alone government sanctioned directions.

In addition, although the various policy development institutes espouse contributing to the wider strategic security environment, the key focus and sources of information remain Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade and AusAID. This serves to ring-fence policy debate in the traditional security sphere, particularly by commentators and contributors drawn from traditional disciplines.

In the next section, an analysis of the strategic security environment will reveal the complexities Australia faces, and the need for more comprehensive complementary policy development relating to policing, the rule of law and Australia’s national security and national interests.

**Australia’s Strategic Environment**

Australian strategic interests have become increasingly complex, with increasing globalised interdependencies and differing fundamental positions on Australia’s security needs. Often these needs have been categorised as global, regional or national, each requiring a range of strategies that require diverse capabilities, often at different levels. 13

Unlike other major or middle powers on the American or European continents, which are mostly surrounded by well-established democracies, Australia’s immediate strategic environment is characterized by a number of insecure and developing states. This has led to the different views on strategic interests and the need to create capabilities that can respond to local, regional and international circumstances.

Key strategies for Australia should be in establishing an ordered security environment which fosters territorial sovereignty, a global balance of power with secure trade and transport routes along with an environment which promotes human rights, economic development and democratic governance. At the core of this, strategic policy must focus on people.

To do so, Australia requires a mix of strategies consisting of independent, joint and coalition\textsuperscript{14} initiatives that are tailored to meet the security circumstances through flexible and adaptable use of the range of government options available, whether military, police, diplomatic, economic or development.

The challenges Australia faces in this strategic environment are complex, ranging from asymmetric conflict involving state and non-state actors through to health pandemics, failed state reconstruction and social dysfunction through increasing poverty, crime and corruption. The increasing impact of these non-traditional threats has refocused the security paradigm from dealing with more traditional threats that are external to a country, and more having to confront internal security problems.

Not surprisingly this has led Australia to contribute to a range of global, regional and national stabilization, reconstruction, humanitarian and development missions as well as various law enforcement operations involving transnational crime, border protection, people movement and resource protection. This has demanded a coordinated and comprehensive whole-of-government approach to deliver effective expertise in addressing each type of threat. The role of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) has been increasingly pivotal in delivering Australia’s responses to the challenges of this strategic environment.

As the Commonwealth government’s only internationally deployable police organisation, the AFP is the primary advisor on matters relating to international rule of law and policing. The AFP carries out this role as part of the whole-of-government process in response to international security, trade and development strategies. In doing so, the AFP works closely with a range of other government agencies and departments including DFAT, Defence, AusAID and other law enforcement partners including the Attorney General’s Department (AGD), Australian Customs Service (ACS) and Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC).

The AFP’s international role has grown significantly over recent years, particularly with the increasingly globalised interdependencies between transnational crime, intrastate conflict, poor governance and human insecurity. Also contributing to these threats is the increased expansion of economic dependencies of ‘fragile’ states on more stable democracies. The linkages between peace, security and development in building stable emerging states emphasise that both proactive and reactive strategies are critical for success.

The AFP is currently undergoing expansion in the functional area of the International Deployment Group (IDG) to manage better its responsibilities for conflict operations.

\textsuperscript{14} In this context ‘joint’ is defined as combined Army, Navy and Air Force operations; ‘coalition’ is defined as national forces combining with other international forces in the same theatre of operations.
across the spectrum of stabilisation and capacity-building requirements. This includes targeted proactive institutional capacity-building, training and mentoring programs as well as the development of a more robust immediate crisis response capability and post-conflict rule of law development programs. This increased expansion demands that the AFP works in an increasingly coordinated manner with government and non-government partners to develop and deliver strategies with the overarching national security and national interests of Australia at the fore. This includes taking a central role in assisting developing and emerging states in the immediate region as well as contributing to UN peace-keeping operations.

In undertaking peace and stability operations, the intervention or deployment of an effective policing architecture to deliver the appropriate outcomes is essential in order to promote rule of law functions. These architectures are designed to allow a community or country to maintain a reasonable level of law and order and prevent a downward spiral into internal conflict, or to return a state to a stable security level following conflict, by creating conditions for progress rather than a void. Each mission is different, often unique depending on the nature of the conflict, cultural impacts and causal factors. The AFP IDG must be cognisant of the need for a diverse range of tasks, skills and responsibilities that will be necessary to achieve successful outcomes.

**Achieving Strategic Insight**

Developing proactive policing strategies in a complex security environment requires new thinking and the challenge for the AFP is to move into ‘a new intellectual space’. Understanding world dynamics and the constant changes as a result of increased globalisation, advances in technology and information flows and societal values will be key drivers in assessing the future impact of crime, particularly what form those crimes will take and the drivers behind them.

Achieving strategic insight into the security environment, however, has generally been regarded as within the purview of the security intelligence agencies, or in the case of private sector organisations such as ASPI, within specifically established teams. The challenge for the AFP in this environment is to enhance the capacity to draw together relevant information from both a criminal and security aspect. Close collegiate working relationships with other public sector organisations such as the Department of Immigration in people smuggling matters, over and above simply addressing the illegality and looking behind the drivers, is one clear example.

In developing these insights it is useful to look at past operational results but also to work collaboratively with government policy developers for future initiatives. The

---

AFP is increasingly seen as an integral partner in the development of new legislation and policy and in providing policy agencies with insight into how new policies might play out, influencing future strategic deployments and planning.

As the AFP develops new capabilities, it is also essential that existing criminal threats and sources of crime are not overlooked. As the world focuses on the threat of terrorism and the activities of religious extremists, transnational criminal organisations such as the cocaine cartels of South America must also receive equal attention.

Balancing the benefits of hindsight together with the foresight to imagine future possibilities will assist the AFP in achieving strategic insight into criminal and security threats, and their associated challenges, in a more cohesive and holistic sense.

The Social Context

Globalisation and the movement of people are constantly shifting global demographics and many of the challenges that previously faced Australian law enforcement officers related to understanding cultural diversity within our society. More prevalent now, however, is the need to understand the social impact of cultural beliefs and ‘civilisational’ affiliations, including how they relate to weakening nationalism as a source of personal identity. 16

In a multicultural society such as Australia, advancing the national interest includes the promotion of Australian values; ‘tolerance, perseverance and mateship’,17 and it is important that law enforcement strategies continue to develop in ways to unite, rather than divide the community regardless of people’s background, culture or location. In addition, the AFP must continue to develop ways in which the organisation can assess and understand international issues and the social drivers behind the sources of transnational crime and interstate conflict. These include understanding ideological motivations which can threaten the security of Australia and Australian citizens, wherever they might be.

Future challenges will also include engaging what can be termed non-traditional international law enforcement and security agency partnerships including cooperative alliances with organizations. This will include working with, for example, coalition forces in Afghanistan to address the ongoing opium trade, and with other national law enforcement agencies to maintain visibility on terrorism-related intelligence. Additional challenges include greater involvement in China and the Asian region.

16 See for example the hypothesis on civilisational conflict and the declining salience of the nation-state as a source of identity; Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.3, 1993, pp. 22-49.
18 For example, the range of law enforcement activities undertaken in Afghanistan.
where growing economies come with associated criminal activity including internet fraud, identity crime and illegal people movements.

Further, the delivery of aid assistance to developing or fragile states in order to promote economic growth and human security through social services and poverty reduction is often disrupted by crime and corrupt practices within state institutions and business. The existence of these factors seriously affects the ability of government institutions to achieve development progress effectively. Without adequately functioning police services, and an independent judicial system, other government institutions will fail to fulfill their civil function. There is also the propensity for corrupt law enforcement officials to affect disproportionately the more disadvantaged individuals, generating further insecurity and fear.

Australian aid programs are not necessarily delivered in benign environments, often requiring the involvement and assistance of a diverse range of police strategies to complement program objectives. These strategies have been briefly discussed earlier in this paper, ranging from training and mentoring indigenous police services through to providing a secure environment for everyday human activity. Recognising that the rule of law directly affects economic growth, quality of life and good governance, demonstrates the growing close partnership required between aid and police organisations.

**International Trends**

The central role of the United Nations, and the adoption of new concepts such as Security System Reform, 19 provide the backdrop to the context of policing in conflict-prone, or fragile state, environments.

The United Nations (UN) remains a key international partner for police, and therefore the AFP, in international peacekeeping operations. The UN, however, has been slow to respond to the challenges of the changing global environment of conflict. Since the high level review into peacekeeping operations, the 'Brahimi Report'20,  was released in 2000, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) released a progress report in 2005 titled ‘Peace Operations 2010’.21 This later report outlines that the resources of the DPKO remain overstretched due to a marked increase in the demands for UN peace operations in states that have either collapsed or have been severely weakened by internal conflict.

---

19 Often also called Security Sector Reform.
In addition, it has been recognised by the UN that the provision of security in these interventions is only one part of the equation in achieving a lasting peaceful solution. In this process the UN has recognized the importance of beginning complementary humanitarian and institutional reform processes at the earliest opportunity during the stabilisation process to address the underlying causes relating to the conflict. Recurring themes include support for public administration institutions, restructuring and strengthening the rule of law as well as addressing the importance of human rights and gender equality.

The UN DPKO has also recognised that, alongside the importance of the military and police in establishing stability and implementing the rule of law, other post conflict partners such as the World Bank play an increasingly integral role in nation-building. Therefore the UN sees itself in a new role as an integrator and standards-setter, as well as the traditional stabilisation agent.

To achieve this new role five key goals have been set to be implemented for future peacekeeping operations looking out to the year 2010. These are:

- Recruitment, preparation and retention of appropriately qualified personnel;
- Preparing and promulgating defined and uniform UN doctrine;
- Developing and maintaining effective UN and non-UN partnerships;
- Securing appropriate and adequate resources to deliver functional outcomes; and
- Establishing effective integrated operational structures both at the New York headquarters and mission level.

In tandem, Security System Reform (SSR) has become an interest for many international organisations, particularly as a key means by which to address state fragility and conflict. Recognising that security is a fundamental component to reducing poverty and increasing the quality of life for the individual, the Organisation for Economic Development and Development (OECD) outlines the relationship between personal and state security along with the right of individuals to access social services and participate in political processes.

At the heart of SSR are four principle objectives designed to create a secure environment which promotes economic, social and political development particularly through reducing armed conflict and crime.

---

23 Jean-Marie Guehenno, pp. 3-5.
These objectives focus on the:

‘i) Establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in the security system.

ii) Improved delivery of security and justice services.

iii) Development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process.

iv) Sustainability of justice and security service delivery.’

As a core member of the OECD, Australia supports the principles of SSR, particularly the need for international development partners to identify and meet the range of security and justice challenges in relation to accepted democratic norms including principles of good governance and the rule of law. Through the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, the SSR handbook was ratified by DAC ministers and heads of agency in April 2007 with a view to providing a sound foundation in bringing together policy and practice across the spectrum of contributors from the diplomatic community, military, police and other security and rule of law practitioners.

Of particular relevance to Australia, and to the AFP, is the focus of the OECD on taking strategic approaches to SSR assessments, rather than unilateral ad hoc programs delivered for short term gains. Additionally, the OECD also recognizes the importance of the whole-of-government approach in providing functional expertise for particular projects rather than relying on attempting to develop multi-skilling of key traditional security actors.

Australia has significant experience in responding the conflict operations, particularly since operations in East Timor commenced in 1999, but also previously in missions such as Somalia, Mozambique, Haiti, Cambodia and Bougainville. More recent whole-of-government deployments to the Solomon Islands in 2003, East Timor again in 2006 and Tonga in late 2006 highlight, however, that there is scope for increased efficiency in interagency planning and external organisation engagement above the current ad hoc interdepartmental committee (IDC) and interdepartmental emergency task force (IDETF) frameworks.

As outlined above, there is a growing international trend to address issues of security sector reform in a holistic sense. In addition to the principles outlined under the internationally sponsored OECD DAC handbook, the following examples of international trends highlight possibilities for change in the Australian framework.

---


Examples of Security Sector Reform from the UK, USA and Canada

United Kingdom Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit

The Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU),\textsuperscript{26} was established in 2004 under the direction of the UK Defence and Overseas Policy Committee to improve the UK Government’s ability to respond rapidly to countries emerging from conflict with well-coordinated and appropriate assistance. The PCRU also recognizes that planning for post-conflict involvement is most effective if undertaken during the conflict stages or, optimally, undertaking conflict prevention strategies with a view to proactive intervention.

The PCRU’s mandate consists of:

- Developing strategies for post-conflict stabilisation including providing a link between military and civilian agency planning processes;
- Facilitation of whole-of-government planning and management for operational component contributions to immediate post-conflict stabilisation operations; and
- Conducting holistic assessments on support delivery practices in countries emerging from conflict to identify and improve performance.\textsuperscript{27}

In addition to facilitating the whole-of-government coordination processes, the Unit also draws upon external advice through a range of experts in capacity-building including governance, security, justice and the public service sector. Future engagements with the PCRU include academia as well as non-government organizations, and key features of the Unit include a rapid deployment capability of personnel able to work in country to commence planning and implementation of programs quickly and in coordination with parent UK departments undertaking longer term planning as well as with indigenous institutions where available.\textsuperscript{28}

US Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

The US State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is charged with leading and coordinating US Government civilian contributions to conflict prevention strategies, as well as preparing and managing post conflict situations through transition programs to sustain peace and promote economic growth.

\textsuperscript{26} Editor’s note, the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit has since been renamed the Stabilisation Unit. The website cited in footnotes 27 and 28 is no longer active.


The S/CRS was established to coordinate interagency integration of civilian and military planning, provide leadership on interagency assessments of potential conflict situations in fragile states and to provide a central lessons learned capacity for international conflict operations. The S/CRS also aims to improve processes by integrating lessons learned into policy and operational planning, supporting budget requests for capacity-building projects, recommending resource allocations to projects and operations as well coordinating responses with international partners. Whilst recognising the experience of military planners, S/CRS also draws distinctions between military and civilian planning needs. Through this process S/CRS has identified a need to address the imbalance between US military and civilian experience and to develop complementary post conflict reconstruction and state building frameworks for civilian planners.29

**Canada – Glyn Berry Program**

In 2006, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) revised previous conflict operations coordination programs into a consolidated human security-focused strategy under the Glyn Berry Program.30 This program is a people-centered strategy, taking into account the rights and security of vulnerable groups of people.

The program’s principal concerns are in the areas of human rights and democracy and include Security Sector Reform.31 The latter includes the rule of law where program objectives include support to international organisations such as the UN and OECD, promoting the UN integrated mission approach and SSR, as well as enhancing international and national policies to effectively integrate transitional justice, national justice and SSR.

Other initiatives of the program developing policy on non-traditional human security threats including growing urban density, the links between effective health systems and conflict, and the development of assessment and indicator tools to address emerging human security concerns. 32

With these developments in the UK, USA and Canada in mind, it is worth comparing the AFP with two comparable forces to distill a set of ‘best practices’ for policing in international peacekeeping and conflict prevention deployments.

---

30 Named after the murder of Canadian diplomat, Glyn Berry, in Afghanistan in 2006.
32 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Glyn Berry Program by Thematic Focus.
Comparing the AFP with counterparts in Canada and New Zealand

The AFP continues to develop a unique capability for international policing initiatives and rule of law strategies in pre- and post-conflict states. This includes reshaping internal structures and sharing capability to address the future security environment. Canadian and New Zealand police forces also show innovation for policing in pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict peacekeeping operations.

Australian police involvement in conflict and peacekeeping operations began in 196433 in Cyprus, and has evolved significantly since 1999 with the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). Experience has shown that rebuilding a country, and the institutions of state, requires not only enforcement skills but also strategic understanding and the ability to train and mentor inexperienced police appointees.

The UNAMET experience significantly reformed AFP management of international deployments from ad hoc selection, preparation and deployment of uniformed police for specifically government determined timeframes, as had been the case in Cambodia. This reform resulted in a more strategic approach linking the longer term needs of nation-building processes and relationships to other core AFP functional activities in the transnational crime environment.

The deterioration of several neighbouring states, notably in the South West Pacific, focused AFP activity on wider national security and national interest concerns, rather than simply establishing a secure environment. The watershed deployment for the AFP in this case was the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) which was police-led, but military-supported.

These experiences in Cambodia, East Timor and the Solomon Islands, taught the AFP a number of key lessons, particularly; the importance of shared understanding between police and military operational methodology in a joint environment, the need for whole-of-government institutional reform to be fully effective and the distinct organisational cultural differences requiring internal management to achieve goals.

Despite these experiences, the AFP and partner Australian government organisations were still challenged by violent events in Honiara, Dili and Nuku’olofa in 2006 which required emergency deployments of police, military and diplomatic staff. These deployments served to reinforce the need for greater compatibility between Australia’s key security providers along with better collegiate thinking and assessments to be more proactive.

Similar to the AFP although over a more recent time period, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has been involved in international peace operations and

33 This predates the creation of the Australian Federal Police which occurred in 1979.
peacekeeping since 1989 with deployments to various missions around the world including Western Sahara, Bosnia Hercegovina, Haiti and East Timor. As the Canadian Government’s national police service, the RCMP is responsible for the selection, training and management of personnel deployed to each mission.

In recognition of the demands on police resources in the international environment, the RCMP has established partnerships with the provincial, regional and municipal police forces of local governments and provinces within Canada. The RCMP now utilizes these policing partners to make up more than 40 per cent of the total Canadian police commitment to overseas deployments.

All requests for deployment of Canadian police are jointly assessed by the RCMP, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Public Safety Canada and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) through an established ‘Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA)’, a multi-agency partnership policy. Historically, funding for RCMP deployments was provided under this arrangement by CIDA.34

In 2006, the RCMP negotiated a new Agreement which saw RCMP International Peace Operations established as a fully-funded operational program within the RCMP. This provided the ability for the RCMP to commence establishment of a dedicated pool of pre-selected and trained police who would be available for deployment when authorized under the CPA. The aim of this program is to provide a more timely, coordinated and proactive response to international peace operations with as little disruption as possible to national policing activities.35

The New Zealand Police (NZPOL) framework for international deployments differs slightly from both the AFP and RCMP in that international peace, capacity-building and intervention operations are combined in a management hierarchy with diplomatic liaison postings at embassies and high commissions. This is managed under the recently created International Services Group (ISG).

The NZPOL ISG primary roles include promoting New Zealand’s law enforcement interests in the international environment complementing foreign policy objectives with a particular focus on the Pacific region. In addition, the ISG supports government commitments to the UN and to regional disaster and emergency responses as required. NZPOL puts particular emphasis on relationship management with foreign partners with a ‘NZ Inc’ or whole-of-government approach under the overarching principles of being a good international citizen and combating global terrorism.

As with the previous case of the RCMP, many of the NZPOL peace operations deployments are funded through the government international aid and development

agency, NZAID. With the exception of a small number of Pacific projects, NZPOL
and the AFP work closely together in the same operations, most notably the Solomon
Islands, East Timor and Tonga.

The Current ADF Peacekeeping Centre (ADFPKC)

The ADFPKC is a small, semi-autonomous joint services centre, located in
Williamtown, NSW, and established within the ADFWC framework to develop and
manage peace operations doctrine and training. The key roles of the centre are to act
a central repository for peace operations and expertise, monitoring peace operations
issues, assisting defence units to train for peace operations, developing doctrine,
procedures and tactics and representing ADF interests in peace operations at identified
fora.

The centre works closely with other government agencies including the AFP, Defence
Colleges including Singapore’s Defence College, however resources are extremely
limited. The centre is staffed by four personnel, with ad hoc possibilities for other
service personnel to undertake short term attachments including international
engagement with foreign defence forces. 36

The ADFPKC however, remains isolated from central government policy making and
other government partners in an increasingly busy peacekeeping environment. There
would be clear benefits from a whole-of-government viewpoint to bring the work of
peacekeeping doctrine development much closer to the strategic policy and operational
stakeholders as well as to the main academic learning institutions for Defence.

Policy Suggestions

This paper proposes a two pronged policy strategy to effectively address the evolving
national and international security environment. These are first, the development of
a National Security Strategy Statement which includes law enforcement, economic
development and Security Sector Reform concepts; and second, the development of a
centre of excellence in policy and operations relating to the international deployment
of Australian resources regarding cooperation in future peacekeeping operations and
conflict prevention.

The current framework of various national security policies is a mixture of the
specific functional requirements of defence, aid, counter-terrorism and national
interest frameworks.37 This mix relies on highly collegiate coordination by each of the
departments concerned and, the good will and knowledge to invite relevant agencies

37 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Advancing the National Interest, 2003.
to the table when discussing future strategic direction.

More importantly though, for the general member of the Australian public and for international partners, there is no coherent and holistic statement regarding the complex global security environment and how Australia views that environment. This is left for individuals to piece together through the various documents from different government departments as described above.

The production of a National Security Strategy outlining Australia’s approach is a pivotal way in which the Australian government and the Australian people can share a clear vision for the safety and security of its people and interests. This does not require rendering current White Papers redundant, rather raising the interconnectedness of each policy with an overall vision.

As the central policy agency of the Commonwealth, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet takes responsibility for the coordination of national counter-terrorism arrangements, but not an overall national security strategy. With the creation of the National Security Division to implement the Strategy in the department, which would harmonise structures with other government departments and agencies, and coordinate responsibilities with the wider federal-state government relationship, the opportunity exists for central policy directive coherence.

The National Security Strategy of the United States provides a sound model for articulating security strategy principles, particularly through key references including to ‘human dignity’; to ‘strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism’ and enhance regional cooperation to address conflict; as well as noting the importance of economic growth and development and improving ‘national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century’.  

In its simplest form, an Australian National Security Strategy Statement (NSSS) should be a brief statement of the key principles to be promoted through the existing policies. It is suggested these would be taken directly out from the Defence Update 2007 and articulated as: ‘security at home’, ‘favourable economic conditions...to sustain our way of life’ and work to create ‘a benign international security environment that promotes our national interests, including the safety of Australian’s overseas.’

Communication of this NSSS would be by the governance structures relating to ownership and responsibilities. Under the current government communications framework, the Australian government maintains a national security website which contains comprehensive information on security policies and government agency

---


39 Department of Defence, A Defence Update 2007, p. 25
contributions. The site however is essentially ‘counter-terrorism centric’. This suggests to the outside viewer that national security only relates to the threat of terrorism, which does not adequately reflect the comprehensiveness of other existing policies or threats. Through this communications hub, the NSSS would be the leading statement of principles, with coordinating links to other policy frameworks demonstrating the relationships between national and international security strategies.

Ultimate ownership of the principles must be through the National Security Committee of Cabinet in partnership with the Council of Australian Governments to reflect the coherency between federal and state government cooperation on security matters. Accountability for maintaining currency and coordination of the NSSS would rest with the Prime Minister and Cabinet’s National Security Division.

The 2007 Australian Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade inquiry into Australia’s Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations received a number of submissions from external observers and stakeholders in conflict operations and prevention strategies. These papers included consideration of the establishment of various forms of ‘centres of excellence’ to inform future peacekeeping operations.

Austcare, an Australian development non-government organisation identified the need for greater whole-of-government coordination through the establishment of ‘an independent national institute as a “centre of excellence” to undertake necessary training and research on peacekeeping, disaster management and other complex emergencies’. In addition, the submission notes the role of the ADF Peacekeeping Centre and possible future roles for the more effective use of this resource.

In a private submission, retired Australian Army Major General Tim Ford, former military adviser to the UN DPKO argues that ‘Australia would benefit by developing a national peacekeeping facility to integrate all civil, military and police peacekeeping training and to coordinate Australian peace operations policy and preparation.’

**Expansion of the AFP International Deployment Group**

Following the approved funding through National Security Committee in 2006, the AFP IDG developed a ‘futures strategy’ encompassing a functional restructure to deliver the range of international law enforcement services with a clear objective of leading the region in policing and rule of law development into the future.

---

40 Austcare, *Submission to the Inquiry into Australia’s Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations*, Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, March 2007, p 15.

41 Austcare, *Submission to the Inquiry into Australia’s Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations*, p. 15.

The following schematic outlines the future structural model for the IDG which provides the basis for this paper’s policy proposals.

Current arrangements for interagency cooperation within this framework continue to rely on communication and liaison; however the AFP has ensured closer cooperation with Defence through the deployment of personnel to the liaison positions shown in the diagram above within the ADF Warfare Centre (ADFWC), Joint Operations Centre (JOC) and Army Land headquarters (LHQ).

Outside of these positions, linkages to other key partners require further establishment. This includes policy development in conjunction with the Senior Policy Coordination Group, research and development with institutions such as ASPI, academic institutions and the Australian Institute of Police Management as well as international engagement with like institutions regionally and globally.

**Security & Humanitarian International Engagement, Liaison and Development (SHIELD) Centre**

This paper suggests that the Australian government establish a Security and Humanitarian International Engagement, Liaison and Development (SHIELD) centre in the Australian Federal Police International Deployment Group.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establish a Security and Humanitarian International Engagement, Liaison and Development (SHIELD) Centre within the AFP IDG.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Acceptability</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural Acceptability</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Acceptability</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resourceability</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational Compatibility</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost / Benefit Advantage</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Rationale for the SHIELD Centre.
Whilst the Centre would be hosted by the AFP, key appointments will be required from central agencies including AusAID through the Fragile States Unit (FSU) and Office for Development Effectiveness (ODE) and Defence.

It is also recommended that the ADFPKC be transferred from the ADFWC and deployed to the SHIELD centre. This would allow the combined expertise of the three organisational functions to combine seamlessly and contribute to collegiate assessment processes. Consolidation under the SHIELD centre would also remove the current isolated nature of processes currently undertaken and remove individual service duplication of effort.

In addition to these key appointments the centre would draw upon appointed project teams from academic institutions and set research tasks which will be developed either in-house, through recognised tertiary institutions or directed research through the Australian Defence College (ADC) Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS), Australian Command and Staff College (ACSC) and Australian Institute for Police Management (AIPM).

While the proposed SHIELD centre would be hosted by the AFP IDG, there are critical internal organisational relationships that will impact upon performance. Close relationships will be required with AFP strategic planning and policy, organisational performance and learning and development teams. To reflect the independent and multi-agency nature of the centre, it is recommended that a form of board of management is formed in partnership with AusAID and Defence and an agreed independent representative.

This creates a single cohesive interagency centre hosted by the AFP IDG. The interagency ‘hosted’ model has a demonstrated success record with the Australian High Tech Crime Centre (AHTCC) providing a sound example of multi-jurisdictional police cooperation complemented by additional stakeholder representation from the private sector and other Australian government security agencies.

The mandate of the proposed SHIELD centre would be to advance Australia’s national security and interests through the intellectual and practical integration of all relevant government agencies in order to deliver whole-of-government outcomes relating to conflict operations, and conflict prevention, strategies. The SHIELD centre will focus on stabilisation, security, transitional and development strategies in the conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict environments and include international engagement partnerships to assist these processes.

The establishment of this AFP IDG-hosted centre provides government with the most holistic and effective option to address the current capability gaps in whole-of-
government conflict operations and prevention strategies planning and assessment processes. This option would promote best practice and models existing international trends in the national and human security environments.

The creation of this centre, represents a highly cost-effective option in terms of creating a new capability to complement existing government institutions. Facilities will be located within the existing IDG offices where all administrative and technical support equipment currently exists. Some minor office design may be required to accommodate multi-agency personnel needs.

Costs involved in the proposed relocation of AFP PKC personnel would consist of physical relocation of staff, including associated removal costs from the current ADFWC location in Williamtown to Canberra. Within the IDG facility, the costs of embedding ADFPKC staff would involve the installation of appropriate Defence information technology support networks to ensure communications interface with Defence management. It is considered that the ADF could meet these costs from internal budget allocations which would mirror AFP costs involved in deploying liaison officers to the ADFWC, Land HQ and JOC.

AusAID costs involved in deploying staff would be met internally, initially by relocating the currently IDG-attached AusAID officer to the SHIELD centre. All existing infrastructure is in place for this to take place. Future costings of any proposed additional AusAID staff would be drawn from the available performance assessment of the current posting.

Additional costs involved in the engagement of academic appointees would need to be met by either single agency funding or joint funding proposals. Indicative requirements would be an identified head of research, and a modest engagement of research assistants, to work alongside fulltime SHIELD centre staff.

In addition to the foreshadowed personnel costs above, it is anticipated that there will be funding required for engagement strategies including conducting and attending international and national conferences, associated travel, internal and external personnel and personal development training, publication costs and general administrative and supports costs. Drawing upon examples of ASPI funding it is estimated that additional unfunded costs would be in the vicinity of $1,000,000 per annum.

With further assessment and consultation, funding from existing programs may partially offset the costs. In addition, hosting and attendance at conference and training

43 ASPI funding outlines Defence funding of between $0.1 and $3.0 million for the first seven years, see: <www.aspi.org.au/aboutaspi/>, accessed 13 September 2007.
workshops could be shared between national and international organisations and the Commonwealth. This may include key partners such as the UN, OECD, the UK Unit, US State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and Canada’s Glyn Berry program.

The proposed changes to first, policy governance through the development of the National Security Strategy statement and second, conflict operations and prevention strategies policy and strategic assessments through the proposed SHIELD centre are not mutually dependent. Implementation of the two key strategies should progress concurrently, however they will inevitably have different milestones. This strategy will outline the two processes separately.

The progression of the National Security Strategy Statement will be considered first. This paper proposes that, under the current government policy framework, the Prime Minister and Cabinet, through the NSD, convene an interdepartmental committee to develop the framework and content of the NSS. The Inter Departmental Committee would be required to report monthly to the Senior Policy Coordination Group with a clear timetable of completing a first draft within six months.

In addition to Commonwealth agency and departmental input, consultation with relevant State and Territory government national security officials should be undertaken through the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) and National Counter Terrorism Committee (NCTC) frameworks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE</th>
<th>DELIVERABLE</th>
<th>RESPONSIBILITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1</td>
<td>NSS Scoping and drafting - Commonwealth</td>
<td>PM&amp;C – IDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SPCG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2</td>
<td>Whole-of-government consultation</td>
<td>PM&amp;C – NSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>COAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NCTC representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 3</td>
<td>Final draft to NSC</td>
<td>SCNS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 4</td>
<td>NSC adopted NSS to COAG</td>
<td>COAG Senior Officials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Implementation of the National Security Strategy Statement

In order to reflect the whole-of-government function and threat environment it is further suggested that the new Defence White Paper be named ‘Defending Australia’, as opposed to ‘Australia’s National Security’ in order to link into the broader holistic National Security Strategy Statement. Concurrently the AFP in Diagram 2 denotes a future proposed Law Enforcement Security White Paper, for which the AFP would
be responsible for coordination and publication of in partnership with other key law enforcement contributors including Immigration and Customs. The suggested title for this paper is ‘Securing Australia’ and it is envisioned that the paper would be developed concurrent with the next Defence update release. This title acknowledges the role that police, in general, have in providing a secure and safe environment for all Australians.

Second, the SHIELD centre would function as a semi-autonomous liaison centre in support of whole-of-government strategic policy assessments, strategic and operational planning and provide an intellectual ‘think tank’ capacity to draw together academic assessments and studies relating to defence, national security, human security, the rule of law, development and economic strategies. The centre would also assist in the development of interagency doctrine and contribute to the design and conduct of a multi-jurisdictional exercise regime, over and above the National Counter-Terrorism arrangements.

Drawing upon existing projects including the AFP/Flinders University ‘Policing the Neighbourhood’ study, the AFP/Griffith University ‘International Policing Performance Indicators’ study, the Defence Joint Military Appreciation Process (JMAP) and AusAID Office of Development Effectiveness indicators, the centre will assist in the development of a holistic whole-of-government appreciation framework. It will incorporate other international standards including the Fragile States Index and Human Development Index, which are clear indicators of social development which underpin rule of law development.

Similar to the UK Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit model, the SHIELD Centre will maintain limited but deployable capacity in cooperation with the AFP, Defence and AusAID to provide in-country planning, advice and initial implementation expertise for current and emerging international commitments. This capacity would provide a linked strategic and operational planning capacity drawing upon the centre’s anticipated ‘all source’ knowledge base which would include input from non-
government organisation and other governance expertise.

In conjunction with national programs including the AFP Law Enforcement Cooperation Program (LECP) and the Defence International Engagement Program (IEP), the centre would develop close links with the British, Canadian and US proposals discussed above, as well as with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations to ensure that global strategies are appropriately coordinated. This is a crucial aspect of the combined program, ensuring the efforts across the spectrum of security sector reform in an identified country or region are not duplicated or contradictory.

The SHIELD centre would therefore draw together the vast amount of knowledge and experience that is derived from studies, program assessments and lessons learned exercises to provide publicly available assessments along with specific organisational recommendations to ensure continuous improvement at the whole-of-government level for future environments. Critical to this process is the ability to provide lessons and recommendations in a meaningful and useful format for actual implementation.

Diagram 3 demonstrates the proposed reporting framework and relationships of the SHIELD Centre:

There are key partner and stakeholder relationships that arise out of the development of the SHIELD centre. As an Australian government-focused initiative it can easily be said that government, and therefore the relevant departments, are the key stakeholders.

As the central policy coordination department of the Commonwealth, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet has a significant stake in the successful implementation of both the proposed National Security Strategy Statement and the SHIELD centre. PM&C currently has central coordination responsibility for national security policy,
the National Counter Terrorism Committee arrangements and COAG coordination. PM&C increasingly takes the lead in overseas crisis & response strategies, although existing frameworks for ongoing planning and management of such responses remain under the DFAT Interdepartmental Emergency Task Force (IDETF) construct.

Bringing the NSS statement under PM&C would ensure central coordination of existing national security policies, harmonising much of the current decentralized effort undertaken by contributing departments.

As the lead department for representing Australia’s interests overseas, DFAT is a key stakeholder in the SHIELD centre concept. The department’s link to the OECD, UN and with links to the other institutions (the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit in the UK, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in US and the Glyn Berry Program in Canada) will be critical to the success of the operations and relationships undertaken and established by the SHIELD centre. DFAT will also need to be consulted closely with respect to future training, conferences and institutional cooperation at regional and global levels.

DFAT’s role in managing unforeseen complex overseas emergencies also offers significant expertise to the future development of doctrine across a range of deployments from conflict operations through to natural disaster incidents.

The ADF is a natural major stakeholder for the AFP in these projects, but not only through the need to coordinate police and military activity better when conducting operations. In 2006, with the increase in resources to the army and the AFP IDG, a strategy of increased interoperability was required by the government. As previously outlined, progress to date has seen the deployment of AFP liaison officers into the ADF at the ADFWC, JOC and Land HQ. As a result the inclusion of the ADF in the proposed SHIELD centre is a natural extension and complementary reciprocal arrangement that will progress shared understanding and knowledge transfer between the two organisations.

Close consultation and negotiation will be required to progress the initiative to redeploy the central ADF peacekeeping policy unit, the ADFPKC, into the proposed SHIELD centre. In conjunction with this, it is envisaged that coordination through this initiative will increase the level of interaction undertaken with the Defence International Policy Division with a focus on elements of the Defence international engagement plan.

The level of cooperation between the AFP and AusAID has also increased over recent years, particularly through the development of joint capacity-building programs covering a range of institution-building activities, not only police and justice programs.
AFP and AusAID have demonstrated the ability to cross-post personnel between the AFP IDG and AusAID Fragile States Unit and it is expected that this will be supported further through the SHIELD concept. Embedding the shared development of program objectives and delivery frameworks involving overseas missions represents a key success factor in the future operating environment between the AFP and AusAID.

In addition to the key Commonwealth stakeholder relationships identified, there is a need to develop strong partnerships with a number of policy and academic institutions. At present AFP IDG tertiary partnerships include Griffith and Flinders Universities as well as the Australian Institute of Police Management (AIPM). Other partnerships that can be leveraged off the ongoing AFP/ADF interoperability initiative include the Australian Defence College, Deakin University and ASPI.

In addition, partnerships with non-government organisations such as Austcare, World Vision, the Red Cross and other humanitarian organisations will increase the holistic approach to strategy development and delivery. Drawing upon the submissions of such organisations to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, there is significant support for the proposed SHIELD centre.

**Conclusion**

The requirement for a National Security Strategy Statement is not a particularly novel idea, having been recommended in various forums as described in this paper, and on numerous occasions. The increased recognition in more recent years of the direct relationships between physical security by force or protection and human security through a combination of strategies is, however, driving the concept further to the front of political debate.

In the current established government structure, the construct of national security White Papers is well understood by the relevant Ministers and policy departments, however to an external observer the various strategies must appear somewhat fractured and functionally isolated. The publication of an overarching and binding statement that links and coordinates existing policies will assist the Australian public, and other security stakeholders, to understand and ‘buy in’ to whole-of-government security objectives.

As suggested in this paper, combining these security concepts in the future operating environment, particularly recognising the relationship between the rule of law, aid and traditional security strategies requires small amendments to the terminology used in existing White Papers. As suggested, the next iteration of the Defence White Paper should be entitled ‘Defending Australia’ to be complemented by a law enforcement national security White Paper titled ‘Securing Australia’.
To complement the proposed national security framework, it has been identified that a gap exists in the strategic assessment and policy development environment relating to the relationship between the rule of law, aid and development. The proposed establishment of a dedicated centre, for security and humanitarian international engagement, liaison and development – the SHIELD concept - seeks to fill this gap and complement other existing government resources.

This gap has been identified by Australia’s security partners in the UK, US and Canada, and each of them have responded with their own centres for coordination and policy responses. Australia has the opportunity to recognise these other initiatives and take the lead in the southern hemisphere in this field. As the AFP IDG training for, and management of, regional peace operations and capacity-building programs matures, the basis for establishing a complementary strategic assessment centre becomes firmer.

Unlike other international models however, the proposed SHIELD centre also provides an opportunity to bring together academic research, policy advice, strategic assessments and operational lessons into a coordinated multi-agency continuous improvement environment. A clear benefit of this is shared knowledge and understanding across government and stakeholder departments in meeting whole-of-government directions.

Should stakeholder departments agree, the proposed directions in this paper represent significantly low cost options to deliver professional and collegiate outcomes for government in an efficient and effective interagency environment.
Bibliography


Australian Federal Police. *Inquiry into Australia’s Aid Program in the Pacific*, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, June 2006.


September 2007.