Enhancing the New Zealand – United States Security Relationship: Is it Possible?

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Abstract

This paper assesses the relationship between the United States and New Zealand. New Zealand is an ally of the United States, but its unwavering anti-nuclear stance has strained relations between the two countries for over 20 years. This paper explains how the relationship disintegrated, sheds light on the importance of renewing the relationship for both countries, and offers insight into how this might be pursued.

This document is approximately 10,000 words, excluding its bibliography and abstract. It prints off at 30 pages.

1 Editor’s note. This paper was written in 2006 and has not been updated. Its references to events, people, and office holders were correct at the time of writing.
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Peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations; entangling alliances with none.²

The close relationship between the United States and New Zealand stems from shared cultural traditions and values. The two nations are vigorous democracies with open market economies that have fought together in various conflicts from World War I to Vietnam. More recently, New Zealand and the United States have worked together in Afghanistan and in Iraq. New Zealand prides itself on being a good international citizen and makes frequent contributions to peace operations.³

Introduction

The relationship between the United States and New Zealand has been long and, to a certain extent, enduring. The two countries enjoy a raft of similarities ranging from using the same language, a British heritage, common values and beliefs and being host to diverse cultures. In short ‘New Zealand and the United States continue to share the liberal values of freedom and peace, justice and human rights.’⁴ In the security domain the two countries have fought together often, including World War I and World War II, the Korean War, Vietnam, the first Gulf War, and more recently in Afghanistan and supporting in Iraq. In fact, New Zealand and Australia were the only two countries to have fought alongside the USA in every major conflict in the 20th century thus sharing a common commitment to helping sustain democracy and international security.⁵

Since 1985 however, that relationship has been strained as a consequence of New Zealand’s anti nuclear stance. New Zealand (NZ) chose to take a different path from the United States (US or USA) in relation to nuclear issues. That position reflected the New Zealand persona to a certain extent, and was subsequently met with what can only be described as punitive action on the part of the USA. Some 21 years have now passed since that legislation was passed into law, and New Zealand has maintained its position – perhaps in an iconic manner – but nonetheless the legislation has endured and the likelihood of repeal is remote.

New Zealand defence personnel continue to operate, fight and work in coalition operations with United States Forces.⁶ Yet they are still generally prevented from ‘exercising’⁷ or training together or using United States’ military bases. No New Zealand military aircraft or ship can use United States military installations for transit.

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² Thomas Jefferson, 1766.
³ Bruce Vaughn, Analyst in Southeast Asian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade, New Zealand: Background and Bilateral Relations with the United States, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 16 June 2006, p.1
⁵ New Zealand provided a Light Engineer Squadron to the UK led Multi-National Division – South West, in Iraq 2004. This was technically part of the UK Division, but part of the coalition forces in Iraq.
⁶ Notably in Afghanistan and Iraq, but New Zealand has also deployed troops to the Solomon Islands, East Timor and Bougainville over the past decade.
⁷ Exceptions are made such as Proliferation Security Initiative activities, addressed later in this paper.
support or any other reason. Intelligence support from the US to New Zealand has been substantially curtailed and that which New Zealand does get is more often than not filtered by its Australian allies. The Presidential Directive remains extant. Some waivers for training or exercising together have occurred for various security activities such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) but for the most part the restrictions remain in place.

The New Zealand population is generally comfortable with the diplomatic and defence posture taken by the current government with respect to the United States and there seems little desire to return to a pre-1985 ‘ANZUS’ environment. New Zealanders recognised the need for formal alliances after World War II and during the Cold War but to remain part of ANZUS is seen as an anachronism. As a former New Zealand Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Merwyn Norrish, reflected; ‘President Bush’s embarking on “singularly ill-judged adventures” has reinforced most New Zealanders belief we are able to make our own decisions without being pressured to go much further because we were ‘allies’.9

If we accept the differences between the two countries, can a suitable and comfortable way forward be found that helps enhance or improve the security relationship? One view that perhaps reflects the pragmatic, diplomatic approach is offered by Merwyn Norrish:

So what do we do vis-a-vis Washington? If we keep going as we are, we are bound to be seen by sensible people there as doing basically helpful things in the world, within our small means. Once things change in DC, either by a radical re-think on the part of the present team there - are we beginning to see the first signs of it? - or after a presidential election, the relationship should surely revert to an amicable and mutually profitable one.10

We must look beyond the take it as it comes or status quo approach and look for constructive initiatives and policies that will help reinvigorate and enhance the security relationship, yet remain within the constraints imposed by the Presidential Directive and New Zealand’s national policies.

ANZUS is not the platform upon which to move the relationship forward. The New Zealand Minister of Defence, Phil Goff, made this position abundantly clear recently when commenting ‘The ANZUS security treaty is no longer relevant and New Zealand has no intention of reviving its role in the three way pact with the United States and Australia.’11

There is room for accommodation by both countries whilst accepting and acknowledging each others national strategic policies and objectives. The opportunity exists and should be captured, as reflected by Christopher Hill, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs: ‘Rather than changing each other’s minds on the nuclear issue, which is a bit of a relic, I think we should focus on the things we can make work.’

This paper will examine the history of the security rift between the two countries with a brief focus on ANZUS, its demise as a consequence of the New Zealand nuclear legislation, the New Zealand disarmament policy, and the implications of the NZ nuclear policy as seen through the various perspectives of different United States’ Presidents. It will then highlight why the relationship is important and why it should be cultivated, both in security and economic terms. The paper will also identify some inconsistencies in the application of US policy toward NZ. Before moving into a number of policy suggestions, it will illustrate current security arrangements and developments, and offer different level policy initiatives to help move through the long standing security imbroglio.

The Relationship

The ANZUS Treaty

No treatment of the New Zealand-United States security relationship would be complete without first examining the ANZUS Treaty and its part in the make-up of security dynamics between the two countries. The ANZUS Treaty that brought together Australia, New Zealand and the United States in a tri-lateral framework for security arrangements and cooperation in the South Pacific was signed in San Francisco on 1 September 1951. ‘The ANZUS Treaty, in which the three signatories pledged to work together in the event of an invasion or attack’ was described officially as ‘the keystone of New Zealand’s security’ and ‘the consensus within New Zealand (in official circles at least) was that the alliance with the United States was indeed the foundation of New Zealand’s national security.’ It was also ‘the first [treaty] New Zealand signed with a foreign power, without the United Kingdom.’ That security arrangement had been built on the residue of concerns from World War II and the emergence of East-West tensions that translated into the Cold War. Both United States’ and New Zealand’s strategic attention in 1951 was focussed on North East Asia –

China, Japan and Korea. A security guarantee was required for the time, and the United States offered that option through the ANZUS arrangement.

The ANZUS arrangement saw New Zealand and Australian forces reluctantly brought into the Vietnam conflict in the 1960s and 1970s and as such the ‘pact was a source of controversy within New Zealand politics, almost from its inception.’ Further ‘While the 1950s and 1960s movements associated with “banning the bomb,” and the Vietnam War, surely raised questions about the ANZUS pact, the activities of the 1970s brought the issue to the forefront.’ The relationship was to be truly tested however in the 1980s with the evolution of the ‘middle class peace movement in New Zealand and the election in 1984 of a government in which many members had been active in the anti-Vietnam War movement.’

The Rift Begins

The global anti-nuclear movement grew during the 1970s and attracted equal attention in New Zealand where its citizens supported a number of rights-based issues. New Zealanders embraced issues such as anti-apartheid, abortion, the environment and the anti-nuclear movement. In particular;

The shift in the focus of anti nuclear protest from a preoccupation with the French in the South Pacific, to a preoccupation with the presence of any nuclear weapons in the South Pacific, to a preoccupation with visits by nuclear powered ships to New Zealand ports, brought the movement closer and closer to a point of difference with the United States and with New Zealand’s membership of the ANZUS alliance.

The presence of nuclear-powered, or nuclear-armed, vessels in New Zealand waters generated massive protest flotillas and ‘activists began a grassroots campaign to force the government to bar from New Zealand ports all nuclear- powered or armed warships (these vessels being symbolic of the treaty) even for routine training and recreation visits.’ Ultimately:

The Labour Party struggled to find a path that could cater for all interests particularly when there were those who wanted a “positive non-aligned foreign policy and withdrawal from all military alliances with nuclear weapons states” and in 1980 the party conference voted to withdraw from ANZUS.

In particular, ‘suggestions floated by the Labour Government in 1983 about allowing nuclear powered vessels into New Zealand waters met with the wrath of party activists who reminded all that they had overlooked the environmental origins of the

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22 Jim Rolfe, ‘Let’s Just be Friends,’ p. 123.
23 James M. McCormick, ‘Healing the American Rift,’ p. 393.
anti-nuclear movement.’

In 1984 Mr David Lange became Prime Minister and introduced his new Government’s ‘Nuclear Free New Zealand Bill’ which applied to both nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed craft, and required such craft to be granted permission by the Prime Minister for entry into New Zealand waters.

A test of this Bill was to come within a year in the form of the formal request by the United States for a ship visit to New Zealand by the USS Buchanan early in 1985. The Labour Government rejected the visit ‘when the Reagan administration refused to provide information on whether the ship was nuclear armed or not.’ To do so would have ‘breached the long-standing United States policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons.’ Despite the Buchanan being an older vessel, and therefore less likely to be nuclear armed or nuclear powered, David Lange as Prime Minister later commented although it ‘was certainly not armed with nuclear weapons….it had to be rejected…Near certainty was not enough for us.’

The reaction was quick and decisive on the part of the Reagan administration. The State Department issued a statement that stated ‘the denial of port access would be a matter of grave concern which goes to the core of our mutual obligations as allies.’ The United States Secretary of State, George Shultz, advised New Zealand ‘that the United States is suspending its security obligations to New Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty due to continuing failure of that country to restore normal access to allied ships and aircraft.’ The Presidential National Security Decision Directive 193 signed on 21 October 1985 known as the ‘United States Policy on the New Zealand Port Access Issue’ set the framework for restrictions and prohibitions with regard to New Zealand and the security relationship. New Zealand was later declared ‘to be a “friend but not an ally” on the grounds that (effectively) banning United States warships from New Zealand’s waters was not compatible with the spirit of the ANZUS Treaty.’

New Zealand now found itself excluded from ANZUS alliance meetings while at the same time the Reagan administration ended political and military contacts with New Zealand.

Certain events of the time which surrounded the rejection of the Buchanan provided context in which to understand the vehemence of the US response. Knowing this background allows the reader to fully understand the depth of feeling by some Americans on the issue and explains why there are those who still harbour deep ill-
will against New Zealand and consequently, why policies to enhance the security relationship need to be incremental and sensitive.

The then New Zealand Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Merwyn Norrish offered a view as to the circumstances surrounding the ‘Schultz message’ which gives substance to a perception that George Schultz might have returned to the United States with. Norrish maintains that Prime Minister David Lange met with George Schultz a week after the New Zealand federal election in 1984, which Lange won, although in that week he was still in the Leader of the Opposition offices. Lange also maintains that he, Paul Wolfowitz and Schultz were the only people present for that meeting. At that meeting (which was taking place before an ANZUS Council meeting) Lange said he would be ‘talking over the matter at Labour party meetings in the next six months.’ Norrish suggested that in this context Schultz could have thought that a newly elected Prime Minister ‘would be able to get the result he [Lange] wanted’. Additionally, Lange chose not to take his Cabinet into his confidence on matters associated with the Buchanan and briefing papers prepared for Cabinet were withheld by Lange. Consequently when the Buchanan decision was to be taken by Cabinet, ‘almost none of the Ministers knew of the Buchanan visit proposal.’

The Australian view of the time came from Michael Costello, the Principal Private Secretary to the Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden, who said:

at meetings between Hayden and his party and Prime Minister-elect David Lange, Lange declared his confidence that his standing in the New Zealand Labour Party, having delivered electoral victory, was such that he would be able to persuade them not to go ahead with their position on nuclear war-ships and that the Buchanan would be able to come to New Zealand. Secretary of State George Schultz told Hayden at the time that Lange had told him the same thing. That was why the Americans were so furious at New Zealand’s subsequent position and at Lange’s claim to a position of lofty principles.

It was with some surprise and total sense of betrayal to the Americans that Lange then found that he could not convince the anti-nuclear activists in his party to allow the ship to enter New Zealand waters, and Cabinet rejected the port visit by the Buchanan. The Americans had felt that accommodations had been made to meet the requirements of the new New Zealand government, had been told by the Prime Minister informally that it would go ahead, and subsequently deployed the ship, only to then be embarrassed by a very public New Zealand government rejection. One can therefore understand the rationale for the robust punitive action taken by the United States administration of the time, and the long standing lingering ill-will toward New Zealand, albeit by a dwindling segment of United States officials and politicians.

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33 Merwyn Norrish, New Zealand Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1982-1988, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personal communication, 6 November 2006.
34 Michael Costello, Former Secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, personal communication, 20 October 2006.
An anecdote circulating at the time was that the NZ-US security rift would probably not heal until the last Ensign serving on the Buchanan at that time retired from the United States Navy.

The coup de grace in the relationship was delivered in two thrusts by different New Zealand governments within three years. First, the Labour government enshrined the anti nuclear legislation in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act of 1987. The Act formally prohibited nuclear-armed and nuclear-propelled ships from visiting the country. The second thrust was delivered by the National Party in March 1990 ‘undoubtedly with an eye to the upcoming election, the National Party adopted an anti nuclear stance, despite it being a long time supporter of ANZUS and close New Zealand-American ties.’ The National Party went on to win the 1990 election but no reversal of nuclear legislation was offered, nor any real healing of the rift with the United States.

The Implications

This section therefore looks to the US response to New Zealand’s nuclear policy. Put simply:

New Zealand’s nuclear free stance led to the United States unilaterally suspending its security obligations to New Zealand under the ANZUS treaty. The United States government laid down some internal guidelines whereby its military forces would not henceforth participate in military training exercises with New Zealand forces.

National Security Directive 193 set the parameters for the US Departments of Defense and State to impose restrictions on New Zealand, and they can largely be divided into three key areas.

First, New Zealand lost the opportunity to engage in military exercises directly with the United States in any environment be it land, air or sea. This prohibition means NZ Defence Force (NZDF) personnel cannot benchmark themselves against other world class forces such as the US, nor develop vital interoperability procedures. It has been argued that ‘in the view of many, the most effective military forces are those that operate within an alliance because it allows for the maintenance of performance standards across nations.’ Australia continues to provide that platform for New Zealand although wider benchmarking with the United States would enable broader assessment and comparisons in training to be shared.

For several years New Zealand military aircraft were also denied transit access to US military installations thus increasing flight times and distances when deploying to

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36 James M. McCormick, ‘Healing the American Rift,’ p.394.
38 James M. McCormick, ‘Healing the American Rift,’ p.393.
Europe or the United Kingdom. By not being able to exercise together, aircrew have become unfamiliar with US and coalition tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) and in conflict zones such as Afghanistan, Iraq and the Gulf this gives rise to possible conflict situations or ‘blue on blue’,\(^\text{39}\) in the worse case. Additionally, New Zealand frigates operated as part of the ‘Multinational Interception Operations’ (MIO) in the Gulf and had to reacquaint with United States TTPs in order to operate safely there. Such operational re-familiarisation takes time and in the meantime platforms are vulnerable. This could have been avoided had the Presidential Directive prohibiting exercising together not remained in effect. It also highlights the dichotomy whereby NZDF personnel are permitted to fight and possibly die working alongside United States, as they have done in Afghanistan since 2003, but are still not authorised to train or exercise together. The irony was not missed by Prime Minister Jim Bolger at the time, who noted; “It was difficult for New Zealanders to understand how it was acceptable for New Zealand forces to fight alongside the United States - but not acceptable to exercise together in times of peace.”\(^\text{40}\)

Second, perhaps one of the more debilitating areas for New Zealand was the drying up of the United States’ intelligence pipeline. New Zealand was prohibited from receiving United States’ military and intelligence information and subsequently had to rely on Australia to filter relevant information through to New Zealand. Richard Brabin-Smith reflected on the relationship:

> Of course there have been difficulties, especially with respect to the limits on New Zealand’s access to United States-sourced intelligence…the intelligence issue does complicate, and inhibit, some operational aspects of Australia’s defence relationship with New Zealand.\(^\text{41}\)

Lastly, a ‘further military impact for New Zealand has been the loss of ready access to resupply of needed military material’\(^\text{42}\) stemming from a single sentence in NSDD 193. It reads ‘With regard to foreign military sales and commercial export licences for defense related equipment, New Zealand should no longer be accorded the “special relationship” of a very close ally.’\(^\text{43}\) Defence spending in the United States required a commensurate increase with the loss of the special relationship and also a ‘repositioning’ in the priority list as to when material, equipment, capabilities and supplies could be delivered. New Zealand has moved to a new status of ‘major non-NATO ally’ which gives it some additional purchasing rights but not in the framework that it once enjoyed. In 1994 US Admiral Charles R. Larson, the CINCPAC,\(^\text{44}\) reflected on the overall loss of opportunities for New Zealand, with the comment that:

\(^{39}\) Blue on blue is a term meaning where friendly forces, or forces from the same side or coalition, accidentally engage with each other.


\(^{42}\) James M. McCormick, ‘Healing the American Rift,’ p.393.


\(^{44}\) Commander in Chief Pacific Command.
New Zealand has missed some opportunities as well – opportunities of professional cooperation with the United States forces. You have missed opportunities for preferential treatment regarding foreign military sales and licensing of defense related equipment. And you missed numerous chances for professional contacts to enhance the expertise and readiness of New Zealand forces.\textsuperscript{45}

It has been estimated in the Australian context that if Australia were not part of ANZUS it would inflict a significant increase in costs for defence acquisitions. It makes economic sense to be part of ANZUS so that money can be spent in other areas such as hospitals and education.

\textbf{The Intervening Years}

From 1987 until today there has been an ebb and flow of policy changes towards New Zealand, dependent upon the US President and Administration of the time. Those Presidents have shaped United States policy and attitudes towards New Zealand although understandably, New Zealand has not been high on their agendas. It is however worth noting how those attitudes shaped US policy.

During President Reagan's administration (20 January 1981 – 20 January 1989) the warmth of the USA's relationship with New Zealand rapidly changed after the introduction of the anti-nuclear legislation; New Zealand and United States became estranged. This is not surprising given that President Reagan was preoccupied by a bipolar world and the continuation of the cold war where the American right wing was gaining traction in domestic politics and the country felt in no mood to compromise over nuclear issues.

President George H.W. Bush came to office 20 January 1989 and was recognised as the President who navigated the United States through the demise of the cold war. Even so, ‘The relationship between New Zealand and the United States remained one of tension and suspicion’,\textsuperscript{46} although from the late 1990 some high level political contacts were made. In 1991, the United States declared the removal of all nuclear weapons from United States surface naval combatants and by extension this move alone should have created an opportunity to heal the wound. This was not to be the case, and the impasse continued into the Clinton administration.

President Clinton took office in January 1993 as the first post-cold war President. ‘There were still uncertainties with that new order and Clinton’s focus was on international economic policy and structural innovation’\textsuperscript{47} His attitude therefore afforded New Zealand the opportunity to have the United States review its policy towards it.

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\textsuperscript{45}Charles R. Larson, \textit{Pursuing the Pacific Paradox, the United States – New Zealand Military Relationship: Past, Present and Future}, Address to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 12 April 1994, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{46}James B. Bolger, \textit{A View from the Top – My Seven Years as Prime Minister}, p. 147.
\end{flushright}
President Clinton approved a unilateral review of the US-NZ relationship in 1993, which allowed the restoration of contact and dialogue between the two countries, at all levels including military.48 In February 1994 ‘The United States government decided to restore senior-level contacts between United States officials with their New Zealand counterparts for discussions on political, strategic, and broad security matters. ‘Political relations were fully restored in March 1995 by the first visit to Washington by a New Zealand Prime Minister in over a decade.’49 At the same time, the Clinton administration stated that “our decision to restore senior-level contacts does not signify a restoration of our previous alliance with New Zealand nor does it foreshadow adjustments in other aspects of our previous security cooperation that have been curtailed.”50

The Bush administration (20 January 2001–present) has significantly reviewed the US-NZ relationship despite its focus on the global war on terrorism since 11 September 2001. Prime Minister Helen Clark met with President George W. Bush and his Secretary of State, Colin Powell in 2002. Powell publicly declared that New Zealand and the United States were ‘very, very good friends’ and that ‘New Zealand responded almost immediately to the attacks of 11 September 2001 offering political and military support.’51 This possibly smoothed Helen Clarke’s visit to Washington D.C. in 2002.

More recently New Zealand hosted Christopher Hill, assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific, who went to New Zealand to ‘brief himself on the country and the relationship.’ Recently retired New Zealand Ambassador to the United States John Wood noted:

Dedicated visits to New Zealand by the senior United States official responsible for our part of the world have been rare and Mr Hill has many important issues on which to lead for the United States. It was helpful that he came and then followed up on New Zealand in his nation’s capital.52

Additionally, the New Zealand Foreign Minister, Winston Peters met with Condoleezza Rice, the United States Secretary of State, when she was embroiled in the escalating Middle East crisis in July 2006. The importance of this meeting cannot be overlooked given ‘the programme came together at short notice and the Americans received New Zealand’s foreign affairs minister appropriately and fully.’53

These events demonstrate both sides are moving to progress the relationship. The

48 John Wood, Perspectives on the New Zealand / United States Relationship, Address to the Wellington Branch, New Zealand Institute for International Affairs, p. 11.
49 John Wood, Perspectives on the New Zealand / United States Relationship, Address to the Wellington Branch, New Zealand Institute for International Affairs, p. 11.
50 James M. McCormick, ‘Healing the American Rift,’ p.395.
51 Jim Rolfe, Let’s Just be Friends, p. 125.
52 John Wood, Perspectives on the New Zealand / United States Relationship, Address to the Wellington Branch, New Zealand Institute for International Affairs, p. 12.
progress is modest but both countries recognise the utility in cooperation.

**The Role of Officials in Washington**

Washington officials play an important role in the examination of the security relationship between NZ and the USA and are important in implementing possible policy steps to invigorate that relationship. Apart from the Presidential directives which set the broad strategic policy parameters, it is the officials in the various departments who give rigour to the directives. The officials cover the spectrum from the Secretaries of the various departments through to mid rank officials. Officials in the US Department of Defense and the State Department are tasked with the implementation of directives, the various reviews that are directed from time to time as well as managing day-to-day affairs and relations between the two countries. State Department officials who are specifically country or region focussed can be influential in formulating foreign policy for a country or area.

Defence officials can also exert pressure on the relationship between the US and New Zealand as Secretary Perry did in 1995. Earlier, in 1985, Secretary William Cohen who was openly hostile towards New Zealand sponsored the introduction of a resolution within the Tariff Act of 1930 that would ‘withdraw from New Zealand the benefits of the injury test’ to dutiable imported products. It was a disguised attempt to introduce economic sanctions. He also suggested in the same resolution that a separate bilateral United States security treaty with Australia which would have helped dissolve the ANZUS treaty.

Experience with mid ranking officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) indicate that the OSD tends to support moves to expand bilateral cooperation provided they remain within the boundaries set by the Presidential Directive. OSD officials have acknowledged generally that they are keen to cooperate but reiterate that the constraints must be recognised and expectations managed.

Additionally, despite normal staff turnover there are those who have been in Defense and State roles who maintain the ongoing drag on relationship improvement and hinder proactive Pentagon initiatives. The more obstructive officials constantly remind New Zealand officials of the need to manage expectations, and point out that any initiatives or processes proposed still have to be formalised. An NZDF official with experience in the Washington environment characterised the role and sentiment of some Washington-based officials:

> Increasingly mid ranking United States personnel do not know the reasons for the United States policy but will continue to implement the Presidential directive. Additionally, a number of senior level Pentagon Officials (for whom the nuclear dispute is personal) have

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“aged out” of the department but have left in their wake a policy institutionalized within the United States system that current incumbents are incapable or reluctant to challenge.\footnote{Protected source, personal communication, 19 July 2006.} Cooperation may have been sanctioned at the highest levels (such as Secretary of State and the National Security Committee) but because of these obstacles in the bureaucracy, New Zealand still has to proceed with caution.

The implications of New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy in the security environment have been significant and costly over the past 20 years but to provide some additional balance to the argument for an enhanced relationship it is useful to consider the US – NZ economic relationship and how that links inextricably to the development of future security policy.

The Economic Importance of an Improved Relationship

Mention has been made above of the direct security implications of the ‘nuclear-rift’ in terms of defence limitations, increased costs and prohibitions. In the wider context, an examination also has to be offered on the economic impact on NZ to illustrate why an enhanced security relationship is important. The economic factor can be overstated, however it is important to note that the relationship is of more consequence to New Zealand than it is to the United States.

In a sense, for the USA the relationship between trade and security are as interwoven as the right to bear arms and enjoy capitalism. For most Americans, the two cannot really be separated. This proposition is reflected in President George W. Bush’s comment when asked if New Zealand’s nuclear policies were having an impact on Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations with New Zealand. He stated, ‘The nuclear policy, obviously, makes it difficult for us to have a military alliance.’\footnote{Malcolm Brown, ‘Interview of the President by Malcolm Brown’, Newswire, 18 October 2003, in a publication by Bruce Vaughn, Analyst in Southeast Asian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade, New Zealand: Background and Bilateral Relations with the United States, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 16 June 2006, p.1.} Media commentary in 2006 after Christopher Hill’s visit to New Zealand also confirmed ‘New Zealand’s championing of the nuclear free cause has also been perceived as a stumbling block to free trade negotiations between the United States and New Zealand.’\footnote{Tony Walker and Tracey Watkins, ‘Closer Defence Links – Relic of nuclear issue should not come between us says top US official.’ \textit{Dominion Post} (Wellington), 6 May 2006, p. 3.}

John Wood, the recently retired New Zealand Ambassador to the United States, succinctly captured the importance of the relationship in an address to the New Zealand Institute for International Affairs.

The United States is New Zealand’s second largest trading partner, a key source of investment, capital and technology, a major country of origin of tourists, and a huge influence – for better or worse – on New Zealand’s popular culture. The bottom line for
us as a country is that many thousands of jobs in New Zealand now depend on American investment and trade in goods and services with the United States. We are talking of two-way trade worth $8.3 billion with the balance slightly in New Zealand’s favour, $40.7 billion of US investment in the country or 18.2% of total FDI; less well known, New Zealand investment in the United States is over $20 billion or nearly 24% of our global overseas investment; the United States is our third largest source of tourists and disproportionately significant in revenue terms.58

Further, the Executive Director of the New Zealand United States Council, Stephen Jacobi, recently commented on the benefits of a bilateral free trade agreement to both New Zealand and the United States.

It’s all about what this country [NZ] needs to do to position itself in international markets and to lift productivity rates. It’s only by inserting New Zealand more fully in the international marketplace can we get productivity up, having a bigger economic space to work in. And that is the relevance of the United States because it is the largest economy with which we can hook up with. The attraction of a deal to the United States is in linking up with a close ally on free trade, “anchoring” New Zealand within their economic space and making sure they have access to things we can provide, including technology, particularly in agriculture.59

The previous United States Ambassador to New Zealand, Charles Swindells, also reflected on the relationship between New Zealand and the United States when he attempted to deliver a speech at Victoria University. The speech was abandoned due to anti-Iraq war protestors drowning him out with chanting, but the speech was made available to the media.60 In it he reiterated the trade figures and the trading relationship but went on to warn that ‘bilateral issues’ over Iraq and the anti-nuclear legislation could not be isolated from trade. Swindells wrote bluntly that the United States government was ‘not prepared’ to entertain New Zealand’s interest in a free trade deal ‘at this time’ and it was not helpful to ‘unduly raise expectations’ about such an agreement. He denied any direct link between a trade agreement and the 19 year ban on visits by nuclear armed or propelled warships. However, he immediately declared that the legislation placed ‘limits on our relationship’ and impeded ‘closer cooperation in some areas.’ With the admonition that ‘friends and allies are not the same thing,’ Swindells demanded an end to ‘this bilateral disagreement’, saying that the United States would never ‘just get over it.’ New Zealand should not be under any illusion that the issue was ‘not cost-free’ and that its continuance would inevitably ‘colour’ future policy decisions.

58 John Wood, Perspectives on the New Zealand / United States Relationship, Address to the Wellington Branch, New Zealand Institute for International Affairs, p. 15.
59 Sue Allan, ‘Building Bridges with Uncle Sam; An Interview with Stephen Jacobi.’ Waikato Times (Hamilton), 7 December 2005, p. 20.
Recent Developments in New Zealand – United States Bilateral Relations

The defence relationship between New Zealand and the United States remains constrained by the Presidential Directive which has coloured all aspects of the defence relationship and the United States still applies wide-ranging restrictions on defence cooperation with New Zealand.

The United States considers it important to reiterate its position whenever it is suggested that the directive can be set aside, and stipulates that the relationship satisfies both parties. The United States considers the issue to be ‘unfinished business,’ a term coined by Secretary of Defence Perry in 1995 to describe the US-NZ relationship reflecting that elements of the relationship were still unresolved but it could move ahead.

Recent developments indicate however, that there has been a considerable shift in thinking. The State Department appears to have recognised it has much in common with New Zealand and is keen to focus on those areas, while still recognising existing constraints.

New Zealand respects the United States-imposed limitations on defence cooperation, while emphasising that its nuclear policy will not change. New Zealand is seeking to operate within the rules established by the United States, and considers ample scope remains for cooperation in a host of important areas. In other words, New Zealand cannot be seen to be ‘chipping away at the Presidential directive.’

In the past New Zealand has assumed (wrongly) that United States proposals for bilateral activities have been cleared with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) before they reach New Zealand and activities have often been vetoed at the ‘eleventh hour. This was seen to be ‘poor coordination between United States Commands and the Pentagon’. The OSD have advised that as soon as their office is advised of proposed New Zealand involvement in exercises that make a direct contribution to operations on which the United States and New Zealand were cooperating, OSD had ‘no problem giving policy approval to PACOM’.

Subsequently, New Zealand has seen and welcomed the waivers given by the United States that enabled the NZDF to take part in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercises Deep Sabre ‘05 and Pacific Protector ‘06. The only exceptions to the Presidential Directive exercising restraints are PSI exercises and MAPLE FLAG with Canada. In all cases New Zealand must seek approval on a case-by-case basis to participate in these exercises. The United States initially urged New Zealand to join the PSI, and continues to request New Zealand to participate fully in it.

New Zealand joined the Proliferation Security Initiative as it is consistent with

its support of international measures to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Reason would thus suggest that a waiver for all PSI activities would be axiomatic. That, however, is still not the case.

New Zealand Foreign Minister Phil Goff proposed to Secretary Rumsfield on Goff’s 2006 visit to the United States that the two countries talk more about bilateral defence planning and coordination. It is understood that the Pentagon agreed that bilateral defence talks of this nature would be invaluable, particularly as New Zealand and the United States continue to work alongside each other to enhance international security. Such talks would ensure a better understanding of the extent of New Zealand’s engagement overseas; help enhance mutual NZ-US operational activities and help progress New Zealand’s bilateral capability renewal programme.

Positive Developments

The positive developments in the last 12 months indicate that the relationship with the United States remains strong but can improve. Developments have taken place in multilateral engagement, with high level visits as well as operational cooperation in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area, procurement, and a number of standardisation arrangements.

The United States decided to rejoin the annual Pacific Quadrilateral Talks involving Australia, New Zealand, France and the USA in April 2006 after a hiatus period of non-attendance. The United States had not attended talks in previous years ostensibly because all necessary engagement had been undertaken bilaterally with Australia. By the United States rejoining the talks, coordination between those nations providing assistance in the Pacific should improve. The Commander Pacific Command (COMPACOM), Admiral Fallon, has also publicly placed renewed emphasis on the talks.

New Zealand saw two high level military visits in January and February of 2006 of COMPACOM, Admiral Fallon and COMCENTCOM, General Abizaid. Indications suggest that the visits were cordial, and a sense of optimism about potential future initiatives and cooperation were aired. Both were highly complimentary about New Zealand’s international engagement and were thoroughly briefed on New Zealand’s military capability upgrade programmes. More often than not, senior officials are surprised at the level of capability improvement being undertaken by the NZDF therefore New Zealand’s capability development needs to be broadcast more effectively to the relevant United States security agencies.

In a new development New Zealand has accepted a Pacific Command invitation to place a law enforcement police officer at the trans-national crime-focussed Joint Inter-
agency Task Force West (JIATF-W) in Hawaii for twelve months. Ideally this should be a precursor to the placement of a military representative into PACOM to ensure better coordination between the Command that the NZDF works geographically most closely with. The prospect of an NZDF officer working within PACOM would permit a closer interaction with that Command and better operational liaison as well as New Zealand visitor coordination in PACOM which has been increasing.

Until 2006 New Zealand had been an observer to the Australia, Britain, Canada, America (ABCA) Armies interoperability forum but has now been accorded full ABCA membership. Previously, New Zealand was an observer under the umbrella of Australia. The ‘observer’ relationship was sound, but New Zealand considered that there would be more to offer and receive were it more active. New Zealand already has staff officers working within the ABCA Standardisation offices in Washington, but the move to full membership status should assist in reinforcing the five-way relationship, and give New Zealand higher visibility within the fora.

The New Zealand Army has been attempting to establish Army staff talks with the United States over the last five years and that has recently been achieved through talks in Washington DC. The senior level Army staff talks will help provide better coordination and synchronisation of issues and activities between the two countries.

Policy and Strategy

Clearly, there has been progress on the security relationship between New Zealand and the USA, at a modest level and pace. Nonetheless, opportunities do exist for enhancement of the relationship through continuing engagement and dialogue and without compromising national interests or policies. What perhaps has been lacking is a clear articulation of policy and strategy to continue to develop and enhance the security relationship. The author’s experience in the international relations environment of the Headquarters of the New Zealand Defence Force suggests that Foreign Affairs agencies are generally reluctant to prepare definitive policy statements for engagement with other countries, as those policies might be seen to be too prescriptive or set parameters that could be politically unappealing. Flexibility is looked for, and anything that could be politically contentious is avoided, hence the absence of definitive policy. Having set the background and context of US-NZ security relationship this final section will offer policy guidance and suggest a framework needed to carry the relationship forward.

Having reviewed the US-NZ defence relationship since the signing of the ANZUS Treaty in 1951, and placing it in the context of benefits of an enhanced relationship, it...
is appropriate to consider the objective of any security policy initiatives with respect to enhancing the US-NZ security dynamic. The objective should be to recognise the importance that New Zealand attaches to a forward-looking and positive defence relationship with the United States that reflects shared interests, and respects the established constraints, while looking for ways to strengthen and enhance the relationship.

**Policy Development**

For the purposes of this paper, the focus of policy will be on security and defence initiatives within what is termed the ‘two track concept.’

The two track concept was first raised in 1993 by Prime Minister Jim Bolger. Bolger was attempting to improve relations with the United States and spoke to a delegation from the American Chamber of Commerce in Wellington. It was noted that Bolger ‘proposed a security track – where the United States and New Zealand would agree to disagree over nuclear ships – and a political track – where the two nations would seek to improve their ties with one another.’

This two track system was not unfamiliar to the United States, nor would it be a precedent. The US has maintained relationships with Japan, China and France even though these relationships were also typified by economic, political and even military disagreements.

Political and economic courses have been deliberately pursued and politicians and officials have engaged a number of policies to support this two track concept. Specifically, in 2006 a course of action was initiated aiming at improving relations between New Zealand and the United States. It centred around four major strategies.

These strategies are first, and as illustrated above, increased political contact supported by more structured engagement by officials. Second, enhanced policy cooperation and engagement between the two countries over issues of mutual interest. Third, there has been a conscious effort to improve the tone of public discussion about the relationship. Finally, in the defence arena, there has been a very real attempt to avoid friction such as has arisen on occasion regarding New Zealand-United States military to military contact.

These strategies aim to position New Zealand for more favourable consideration by this or future United States Administrations. Central to this relationship improvement strategy is the proposition that New Zealand, as a long standing friend of the United States, ought to be seen as a partner of value in its ‘new paradigm’ of global and

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64 James M. McCormick, ‘Healing the American Rift,’ p.394.
65 James M. McCormick, ‘Healing the American Rift,’ p.395.
regional responsibilities. In this context, the New Zealand-United States nuclear impasse should no longer be the sole measure of New Zealand’s status in the eyes of the United States.

**Advocate Groups and ‘Marketing the Relationship’**

At the diplomatic and political level, New Zealand needs a deliberate policy to identify, foster and rebuild relationships between Wellington and Washington. All lobby and advocate groups need to be provided with accurate and relevant information and briefings on matters from trade through to security issues. Early in 2005 for example ‘New Zealand’s cause received a boost when a group of legislators launched the Friends of New Zealand Caucus in the United States Congress to help give New Zealand a voice.’66 This group included the New Zealand Ambassador to Washington, the United States Ambassador to New Zealand, and senior members of the United States State Department with roles specific to New Zealand.67 In addition, former senior US departmental personalities who have a favourable track record regarding New Zealand such as Richard Armitage and Randy Schriver, need to be cultivated.

**The Utility of Reference Points**

One policy that should be employed and reinforced as part of the ‘relationship marketing’ is the use of certain ‘reference points’ to help the United States re-evaluate the relationship with New Zealand. As suggested by John Wood:

> A more modest objective of trying to improve the relationship, of taking it forward in areas where we do not have fundamental disagreement, is judged to have its own mutual benefit and, being less ambitious, should be more likely of achievement.68

A set of reference points should be used which are both current and persuasive and yet offer the resolute and consistent message from government and opposition that New Zealand’s anti-nuclear legislation will not be amended. The message conveyed by the Prime Minister and other Ministers, both publicly and privately, is that while recognising the constraints arising because of its anti-nuclear legislation, it wants an improved and more cooperative relationship with the United States and is prepared to work towards that goal.

The reference points might include the fact that steps are underway to rebuild New Zealand’s defence capability through adherence to the Long Term Development Plan (LTDP) announced in 2004 and recalibrated in 2006. The LTDP gives clarity and transparency to the active programme of capability development of the NZDF over the next 15 years and should serve as a practical example of the government’s efforts.

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66 Sue Allan, ‘Building Bridges with Uncle Sam,’ p. 20.
67 For example, the Director of the Office of Australia, New Zealand and Pacific Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
to upgrade and modernise the defence force so that it can play a constructive role wherever it is deployed.

In terms of deployments, New Zealand’s role in Afghanistan through the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Bamyan Province and the employment of the Special Air Service in concert with other special forces needs to be made clear. In many domains, New Zealand’s reticence to ‘blow its own trumpet’ has been to its own detriment when arguably, to broadcast more actively the role and performance of the Afghanistan contribution, would be far more productive in the relationship-building sense.

Equally, on the international stage New Zealand’s participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) should be more widely recognised. New Zealand joined the PSI at the invitation of the United States and has been an active participant in the programme including the use of a RNZAF Boeing 757 on an exercise in West Australia in 2006. The Proliferation Security Initiative, the Regional Maritime Security Initiative, Maritime Domain Awareness and the United States Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Mullens) increasingly multilateral promotion of the “1000 Ship Navy” are not empty rhetoric, and all provide opportunities for engagement.

New Zealand’s interventions in support of stability, good governance and development in the Pacific including Solomon Islands and in East Timor are in keeping with the United States’ strategic requirement for regional responsibility. New Zealand has demonstrated a unique ability to be culturally sensitive to Pacific issues and has assisted in crafting together plans where Australia on its own might not have succeeded because of its perceived ‘post-colonial’ approach. New Zealand has a flair for cultural sensitivity and being seen as the Pacific’s ‘honest broker’ and should therefore capitalise on that to help secure an improved relationship with the United States.

Some effort has to be delivered into the security risks evident in the Pacific and as far west as East Timor, (described as ‘new generation threats’). These threats include failed states, and the risk of these nurturing terrorist networks, drug trafficking, money laundering, weapons proliferation, and people smuggling and trafficking. Opportunities for both NZ and the US to work more closely together ‘particularly as concerns rise about failed Pacific states and the rising influence of China in the region’ were articulated by ‘well placed former Republican officials’ during the Foreign Minister’s visit to Washington. Indeed, if one couples the image of New Zealand as the Pacific’s ‘honest broker’ with the security risks of the Pacific and the rising influence of China in the region then New Zealand clearly does have a role that benefits the US.

Policy Framework

Essentially a policy framework for future United States – New Zealand cooperation has to be established in order to move forward. This will require policy that permits officials to have an architecture for consideration by both governments. Possible areas of future cooperation could be identified that recognise the boundaries of US-NZ cooperation arising from the United States policy on New Zealand’s anti-nuclear legislation.

A host of constructive yet modest possibilities exist for future security development and enhancement that fall within this framework. In terms of enhancing the New Zealand-US security relationship the framework effectively has two key pillars. The first is coordination and consultation, the second is operations.

Many possible policy initiatives exist under the coordination and consultation pillar that demonstrate New Zealand’s willingness to use its skills and capabilities in pursuit of regional and international security. To achieve this, high-level exchanges of information on strategic security-related issues that affect the region are needed. New Zealand and the United States can collaborate on resource protection in the Pacific and Southern oceans and also share in intelligence on counter terrorism and transnational crime. Opportunities also exist for greater coordination and consultation on regional military capacity-building efforts and other areas of mutual concern. For example, consultation could occur on the domestic political effects of upgrading military capabilities of Pacific Island countries to allow them to participate in more peacekeeping initiatives. Similarly, the PSI represents a successful initiative for further interaction and development in terms of strategic mutual concern.

As part of this process of consultation and coordination it would seem appropriate to have senior New Zealand Defence Force and Ministry of Defence representatives visit the United States regularly. It would seem reasonable to have the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), the single Service Chiefs, the Secretary of Defence plus other senior Ministry of Defence officials visit Washington DC at least once during their tenures if not twice. In the same vein, Commander Joint Force New Zealand and Component Commanders should make visits to PACOM to enhance the operational level relationship. As part of the visit and engagement process a firm offer of reciprocity from New Zealand should exist with the United States to ensure that the visits are not perceived to be one-way.

The value of senior level staff visits are not easily measured but the opportunity for the forthright exchange of views and interaction affords long term tangible results. When senior officials make visits to the United States, they are required to brief their principals on New Zealand issues and developments and consequently they become more familiar with the international contributions New Zealand makes. A certain
level of ‘relationship marketing’ has to take place at all levels but priority should be
given to the very senior level where influence and decision-making occurs.

Consideration should be given to closer coordination between the United States and New Zealand before key regional meetings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC) to ensure that a certain level of security calibration and synchronisation exists where necessary. The ARF specifically covers security dialogue and there should be coordination over matters of interest. APEC is not a security-based meeting as such, but there is a subtle movement toward discussing matters of security such as that witnessed at the 1999 APEC leaders meeting and the East Timor crisis. Closer liaison before those events allows for the national positions to be defined and understood, thus ensuring harmonious public announcements from such multilateral bodies.

New Zealand has a role to play on the international security stage and this is shown by its deployments to Afghanistan, East Timor, Bougainville and Solomon Islands. However, room does exist for improvement in coordination with the United States on military operations, within the existing constraints, to ensure efficient use of resources and avoid duplication of effort.

This leads on to the second pillar of the security framework; the operational environment where policy options exist to enhance further the security relationship. First, Single Service and the Joint Force Headquarters need to identify those activities they wish to conduct with the United States at least a year in advance. Once those activities are identified, separate requests need to be submitted demonstrating how these activities benefit the United States’ and New Zealand’s joint interests worldwide. Recently, there has been an increasing awareness within the United States of the role other countries can play within the security dynamic, and that diversity represents opportunity. The key enabler to achieve a coalition is interoperability.

New Zealand needs to expend effort and resources in building the relationship with PACOM. The New Zealand military relationship tends to be defined through the relationship with PACOM and whilst senior level interaction is strong, depth in the relationship is needed by enhancing interaction at the operational level. One small example of the senior level interaction is the high level New Zealand attendance at ANZAC Day services in Hawaii which provides entrée into the PACOM environment. New Zealand should expand ANZAC day activities in Hawaii across all ranks highlighting the shared cultural similarities.

Second, New Zealand needs to leverage its actual operational commitments by requesting appropriate readiness activities and support. For example, should New Zealand choose to redeploy to the Multinational Interception Operations in the
Gulf (MIO) then the NZDF should request support from PACOM en route to assist in working the ship up. When deploying, New Zealand should request the use of PACOM facilities thus allowing interoperability to occur plus increasing PACOM's visibility of NZDF capability.

By extension, there is a possibility of professional exchanges between New Zealand and the United States Coast Guard and possible joint planning for search and rescue operations and Coast Guard / RNZN interdiction training. Lastly, New Zealand should capitalise on its maritime experience and consider the provision of New Zealand maritime security advisers to all countries in the Pacific.

Another aspect of the operational relationship-building framework is a proposal for New Zealand to make overtures to the United States to consider allowing New Zealand military aircraft access to United States military installations for transit and operational purposes (separate from Afghanistan). Presently United States assets fly into New Zealand bases and operate there, as in Operation DEEP FREEZE (the Antarctic) but the NZDF is currently denied reciprocity. In the DEEP FREEZE situation United States aircraft (C-130, C5, C-17) are deployed to support the summer rotation of American scientists and support staff between Christchurch and McMurdo base in the Antarctica and have been doing so for 50 years. By returning to a position of reciprocity of base or port support it demonstrates that there is equality of policy between the two countries as well as developing a modicum of military interaction.

A more mature component to the policy framework is the resumption of military exercises between New Zealand and the United States. Any such exercises would standardise equipment, command and control, communications, doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures to ensure interoperability. These exercises would be best held offshore in the short term so that no ‘neither confirm nor deny’ confrontations are raised as well as affording NZDF assets deployment opportunities and permitting the United States to employ whatever platforms or assets it wishes to use. By exercising together, NZDF assets would be better prepared to operate in a coalition environment such as that seen in Afghanistan or the Gulf and improve its overall operational readiness.

The final component to the overall policy framework is the consideration of a Defence Cooperation Agreement between New Zealand and the United States. Acknowledging that New Zealand generally pursues a multilateralist approach in the international community, the prospect of a well-structured defence agreement with the United States would possibly be better received in the current environment as an expression of the two countries’ maturing security relationship. It would mark a definitive end to the ANZUS treaty and the legacies from the cold war while offering a fresh,
contemporary, innovative, flexible and mutually beneficial security relationship. The agreement could include details on how the relationship caters for those issues raised earlier in this paper; defence coordination, programming of activities as well as any specific boundaries or limitations to the relationship. By so doing, the ambiguity of the ‘unfinished business’ can be set aside and the security relationship formally progressed without being locked into a formal treaty. A treaty would be a formalisation that most New Zealanders would be most uncomfortable with.

**Coordination of Policy and Policy Financial Impact**

The issue of security relationship enhancement with the United States is one that needs to be coordinated at the highest level in a ‘whole of government’ environment, and as such the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet is the recommended agency to take primacy in application of policy. The other agencies with key roles in policy application include HQ NZDF and the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs.

Within the construct of policy development there is the requirement to analyse the fiscal costs of any new policy or policies. The prospect of any security relationship policy enhancement with the United States carries a relatively small cost in real terms as most of the activities are of a nature that already occur in the defence communities of both countries and would require only a refocussing of effort and priorities. ‘Relationship marketing,’ the use of reference points, and the proposals offered under the coordination pillar would tend to be ongoing within the international engagement arena. Additional costs would be incurred through an increased number of high level contacts and visits with the United States, plus hosting and meeting responsibilities in New Zealand.

The operational pillar is that which could provide a cost escalation but arguably this is an area that simply begs reprioritisation from other exercise and operational activities. In the relatively frugal New Zealand fiscal environment, the NZDF and Ministry of Defence budgets are unlikely to be increased to allow for enhanced security engagement with the United States and therefore reprioritisation would be necessary. The Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) relationship would have to be re-examined to determine an effective balance between security engagement with the other four powers and a rekindling of the relationship with the United States. Given the current level of activity with the United States in the coalition environments of Afghanistan and the Gulf such a reprioritisation of effort would not be difficult.
Conclusion

The opportunity for enhancing the security relationship with the United States has never been better. A gradual warming in relations over the last 21 years in concert with a maturing respect for each other’s national policies provides a platform for engagement and progress. Clearly, some barriers remain in the relationship but areas have been identified where room for manoeuvre does exist between the United States and New Zealand. New Zealand’s performance in international deployments in conjunction with its multilateralist foreign policy is testimony to its role as a responsible international citizen that some elements in the United States recognise. It is now up to New Zealand to expand that awareness base.

Using common reference points, and a strategy of relationship marketing, the relationship could progress in a more positive manner. This should help the United States re-evaluate its position with respect to New Zealand, and to be more amenable to cooperating in security areas where the two countries do not have fundamental disagreements. This would be consistent with changing international dynamics, globalisation and new generation security challenges. New Zealand is poised to play its part, regardless of size in the international context, but with a real role in the region, or in a coalition environment.

As Goff noted:

New Zealand and the United States share common ambitions centred on the promotion of democratic values, human rights and law. Advancing these ambitions is an area where our two countries can engage and cooperate...It serves neither of our interests to let this disagreement (Nuclear) prevent cooperation between our two countries across the widest range of fronts, including on security matters....I look forward to working together to develop that relationship further so that we can pursue objectives we have in common.71

Policies for security enhancement should sit on the two pillars of coordination and consultation and operations. Scope exists for significant expansion of coordinating events between the two countries that would permit a better synchronisation of security activities and would also improve operational harmonisation and interoperability. High level visits, exchanges of information and intelligence, a focus on the Pacific and New Zealand’s role there in concert with PACOM all offer opportunities for security enhancement. More directly, though in an operational context policies are available that could allow improved security relationships in the environments of PACOM, the United States Coastguard, US-NZ Antarctica operations, the PSI, offshore military exercises and reciprocal port or base usage arrangements.

Progress will have to be incremental and measured, so that no misconceptions

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71 Phil Goff, ‘NZ’s Defence Policy and the Factors that Shape it.’ Presentation to the visiting US Air Warfare College, United States Embassy, Wellington, 6 March 2006.
occur between the two countries as they move the relationship forward. If policies and processes are adhered to then the relationship should continue to improve to the extent that, should it be deemed appropriate, a defence cooperation agreement could be considered. Such an agreement would truly reflect a growth and maturity of security relationship well beyond the anachronistic ANZUS arrangement. The application of a set of security enhancement policies with the United States in a whole of government context could assist New Zealand and the United States in moving through the security imbroglio initiated 21 years ago. Neither country is required to change their well defined national policies but opportunities exist for an overall improvement in the security relationship based around the values that both countries share.
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