New values, old basics: How leadership shapes support for inclusion

Brigadier Nicholas Jans, OAM
September 2014

Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies
Australian Defence College
Summary

Our work in implementing this strategy starts with accepting individual responsibility for one’s own behaviour, assisting others to live the culture, and putting the onus on leaders to be exemplars of positive and visible change at all times.

Pathway to Change: evolving Defence culture

The major role of the leader is to get their followers to identify themselves with a ‘we’ whose goals are aligned with those of the leader.

The New Psychology of Leadership, 2013

The objective of this paper is to review the scholarly literature to ascertain how leadership can play its part in strengthening support for inclusion in military organisations.

The review reaches four related conclusions. Firstly, support for inclusion is simply one of a number of similar ethical attitudes/values that are amenable to leadership influence, so there is much to be learned from the broader leadership literature. Secondly, local leadership is fundamental to reshaping attitudes and values of any kind, especially those concerned with deeply-held values such as inclusion and diversity. While senior leaders can set the agenda and encourage and monitor progress, the ‘heavy lifting’ must be done by middle-level officers in ships and units.

Thirdly, there are benefits in presenting change as a return to the roots of a group in order to bring it closer to its ‘true’ identity. While this is of course the approach being taken in Pathway to Change, the effect is much more powerful when the message comes from local leaders rather than from the distant top.

Finally, the key elements of the leader-follower influence process can be expressed by a ‘3Rs’ model of leadership. This proposes that leaders are most influential when they Reflect what is deemed exemplary in the eyes of group members, Relate to members in ways that make them feel respected and valued, and Reinforce members’ behaviour within supportive group climates. The ultimate effect occurs when ‘members’ become ‘followers’ by modelling their behaviour on a leader’s example and thus internalise key elements of that leader’s values and perspectives.

The review presents evidence on the current state of each of the 3Rs in the ADF in general. Because of the paucity of research on ADF leadership, such assessments are necessarily speculative. While there is some evidence that the ‘reflecting’ element is strong, the ‘relating’ element seems to be less so; and there are no indicators that can be used to assess the ‘reinforcing’ element. The review proposes some hypotheses/research questions that deserve investigation in an institution that places a premium on leadership.

Reassuringly, there is nothing in the review that would be alien to a military professional. The ‘new values’ that the ADF seeks can be best realised by concentrating on some ‘old basics’. With its strong ethical climate, well-ingrained leadership culture and sophisticated personnel systems, the ADF has a significant advantage over other organisations in creating and sustaining appropriate behavioural standards. Or to put the argument slightly differently: if the ADF can’t do this, which organisation can?


Introduction

The strengths and limitations of senior leadership in cultural change

I will be ruthless in ridding the [Australian] Army of people who do not stand up for its values. If you become aware of any individual degrading another then show moral courage and stand against it.... The standard you walk past is the standard you accept.... If we are a great national institution, if we care about the legacy left to us by those who have served before us, if we care about the legacy that we will leave those who will in turn protect and secure Australia, then it is up to us to make a difference.

Lieutenant General David Morrison, Chief of Army, June 2013

The General looks squarely at us through the camera’s lens. In blunt, no-nonsense terms, he states his concerns regarding professional behaviour and his expectations of every person under his command. His words resonate not only through the Army but also through civilian society. In the stream of comments underneath the You Tube clip of General Morrison’s address, the sense of admiration is palpable, as is the expectation of the message’s effect. ‘Surely’, you can feel people thinking, ‘this will sort out the recalcitrants. Because soldiers obey, don’t they?’.

Well, yes—and no. For all its distinctive features, the military has many similarities with any large organisation, in that expectations don’t always penetrate to lower levels as effectively as senior leaders would like. Senior leaders can certainly influence what people do but they are usually much less successful in shaping how people think and feel.

This is illustrated by the findings of attitude surveys conducted in the months before and after the General’s message in June. In May 2013, only a small minority (32 per cent) of those in the Army sample had expressed belief that ‘senior leadership’ was committed to Defence’s overarching program of cultural reform (Pathway to Change). By the following October, this had risen slightly to 40 per cent, with another slight rise (to 45 per cent) by February 2014: improvements certainly but still reflecting somewhat unsupportive attitudes. Similarly, while only 25 per cent in May 2013 had regarded their immediate supervisor as being committed to Pathway to Change, the subsequent rises (to 32

Senior-level expectations don’t always penetrate downwards as effectively as senior leaders would like

---


4 YourSay: Organisational Climate Report (April 2014). YourSay was administered on-line to a 12.5 per cent random sample of Defence people in February and May 2013, to a 15 per cent random sample in October 2013, and to a 20 per cent sample in February 2014. The sample is representative of rank/level, Service and gender. The sample was representative of rank/level, Service and gender. Army response rates varied from 31 per cent in May 2013 to 46 per cent in February 2014.

The 'new values' that the ADF seeks might be best realised by concentrating on some 'old basics' in terms of the practices of leadership and the obligations of officership.

Objective

The objective of this paper is to review the scholarly literature to ascertain how leadership can play its part in strengthening support for inclusion in military organisations.

Approach

In this paper, 'inclusion' relates to the extent to which opportunities for employment and advancement in a workplace are equivalent for all demographic groups, while 'support for inclusion' means the extent to which members of the dominant social/cultural groups accept the legitimacy of such practices.

From the outset, the review faced a fundamental problem: there was not very much to review on the specific question of how local leadership shapes support for inclusion. There is much on inclusion management itself but little of it explores how it can be influenced by leadership. And virtually all of that literature focuses on the role of senior leadership. To overcome this problem, the review made the reasonable assumption that support for inclusion is simply one of a number of similar ethical attitudes/values that are amenable to leadership influence. Therefore, influence of support for inclusion entails processes similar to those associated with leadership and ethical issues in general, with much to be learned from the broader leadership-values literature.

A wide net was cast. Over 300 books and papers were examined, most of which were published in the last decade. Many were based on research in military institutions. Particular attention was given to papers published in prestigious and influential journals, such as the Annual Review of Psychology series and the Journal of Applied Psychology.

---

6 The discussion leaves aside the possibility that these were not appropriate questions to ask. It may be more useful for surveys such as this to focus on the kinds of behavioural outcomes at which Pathway to Change aims, rather than adding to an understanding of its purposes.

7 Department of Defence, YourSay: Organisational Climate Report, Department of Defence: Canberra, April 2014. The February 2014 YourSay climate survey was administered on-line to a 20% random sample of Defence people. The sample is representative of rank/level, Service and gender. Response rates were not given.

8 Annex A contains definitions of key concepts.
The challenge of change

Despite what leadership theories and evidence would suggest, the managerial playing field continues to be tilted in favour of men and behaviours associated with the masculine gender stereotype.

Gary N. Powell, ‘Six Ways of Seeing the Elephant’, 2012
(a review of the literature on gender diversity)9

Barriers to support for inclusion in military institutions

Virtually all contemporary Western military organisations in developed nations aspire to ‘new values’ in terms of support for inclusion.10 Their aim is not only to sustain personnel strengths in the face of demographic challenges in developed nations (a shrinking youth population and a fierce war for talent) but also to enhance and expand the ‘soft capability’ now seen as a crucial element in operational and organisational effectiveness.11

While some people are apprehensive that inclusion degrades capability, there is no empirical evidence to support such a view. In fact, the few studies that have investigated military-specific issues in this regard tend to find that, at the least, inclusion does not reduce military performance.12 And the evidence is much less equivocal for business organisations, particularly at the senior management level, with most such studies showing that business performance is enhanced by the inclusion of women at the top.13

---


10 See the 2010 bibliography by the Norwegian Defence University College: Kari Fasting and Trond Svela Sand, Gender and Military Issues: a categorized research bibliography, Norwegian Defence University College: Lillehammer Norway, 2010, available at http://www.vid.no/Documents/1_FI/Sekjoner_per_cent20for_per_cent20milit_per_centC3_per_centA6r_per_cent20ferdighetsl_per_centC3_per_centA6re/01_per_cent20Gender_per_cent20and_per_cent20Military_nettdistribusjon.pdf accessed 16 September 2014 (and I am indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Charles Knight for drawing my attention to this source).

11 ‘Soft capability’ is analogous to ‘soft power’, a term coined by political scientist Joseph Nye (Soft Power: the means to success in world politics, Public Affairs: New York, 2004) to describe a complementary process to ‘hard power’ (the influence stemming from implicit or explicit threat, coercion or extrinsic incentives such as money). According to Nye, a country’s soft power is a function of its culture, political values and foreign policies. Similarly, soft capability is the influence that stems from an organisation’s intellectual capital (the thinking power that it can bring to bear on both routine and novel situations) and social capital (features of social organisation, such as networks, norms and trust, and various other qualities that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit and for broadening people’s sense of identity from the ‘I’ to the ‘we’).


Virtually all contemporary Western military organisations also face the challenge of dealing with unsupportive attitudes among the male majority. This is discussed in a recent paper in a leading international military sociology journal with the blunt title of ‘The war against the female soldier’. It documents many examples from various armies that reveal ‘frequent aggression towards female soldiers, particularly in training centres and combat units, in the form of misogynistic jokes, denigrating glances and sexual harassment’. Such indicators confirm that, while it is comparatively easy to embed traditional values (professionalism, service, courage, loyalty etc), taking military people down the inclusion path from ‘compliance’ to ‘acceptance’ to ‘commitment’ is generally a very different matter.17

There are a variety of reasons why this is the case. To begin with, military institutions reflect the norms of their broader national societies, and general indicators of these are not encouraging. For example, Australian surveys of sexual harassment levels show a steady and significant level of harassment reported by adult women over the past decade: 28% in 2003 (compared to 7% of men), 22% in 2008 (5%) and 25% in 2012 (16%).18

These behaviours and their underlying attitudes often have deep roots. A recent study of Australian social history shows how patterns of high or low inclusion were stamped on regions and industries more than a century ago, giving rise to enduring perspectives on and practices of inclusion.19 It showed that support for inclusion tends to be lowest in industries/regions that have had historically low female representation, that is, the lower the proportion of women in an industry/region a century ago, the lower the current support for inclusion in that industry/region today.

Military organisations are an obvious example of an ‘industry’ with a traditional approach to inclusion/gender employment. As a consequence, they contain many distinctively psychological and sociological factors that add up to a formidable set of barriers to those who do not fit the conventional ‘insider’ models. For example, the military has a ‘tight’ culture in which shared identity, social stratification

and clear norms and expectations are exercised in a predominantly male culture. Those who see themselves as representing the predominant culture often exercise or threaten strong sanctions for deviations. Social stratification coupled with a male-dominated cultural model can lead to multiple variations of a game of ‘winners’ (insiders) and ‘losers’ (outsiders). The insiders are those who are socially strong and conform to the cultural ideal; the outsiders are those who are informally judged to fail or pose a risk for the culture.21

Moreover, because many ADF members (and, indeed, some junior leaders) are at a relatively early stage of moral maturity, they are particularly susceptible to informal norms, stereotypic prejudices and peer pressure.22 They go through a number of socialisation events—recruit training, early specialist training, and first appointment—while still at an impressionable age. While many will subsequently develop more informed and nuanced views and values, the effects of many of the more unfortunate attitudes linger for some time.23 The potential influence of contemporary social media—a topic that awaits more thorough examination by military sociologists—is an additional factor in moral development.

The very language that is common among men can be a source of reinforcing cultural stereotypes. Prime examples are the terms ‘mate’ and ‘mateship’. Very few men use these words with an exclusion motive but they do not realise that many women do not relate to such terms.24 Such language is one of several indicators of an unconscious masculinity at work in society that, while more obvious to women, is less recognised by men.25 And, despite all the evidence showing that women leaders perform at least as well as men, the male leadership stereotype is deeply embedded in the collective unconscious at a societal level.26 Even though most women in management no longer see their roles in gender-specific terms, many people—women as well as men—continue to have a ‘think leader: think man’ mindset.27

21 James Warn and Alan Okros, ‘Perspectives on ADFA Cadet Culture’, unpublished paper prepared for the Beyond Compliance review.


24 According to social commentator Hugh MacKay in his book Advance Australia Where? (Hachette: Sydney, 2007), the concept of ‘mateship’ is a favourite with men but not with women.

25 Elizabeth Thomson, Battling with Words: a study of language, diversity and social inclusion in the Australian Department of Defence, Department of Defence: Canberra, 2014.


27 A. Genat, R.E. Wood and V. Sojo Evaluation Bias and Backlash: Dimensions, Predictors and Implication for Organisations, Gender Equality Project, Centre for Ethical Leadership, University of Melbourne 2013. The question of whether women and men lead in different ways has been the focus of considerable research in
Nor can it be assumed that progressive exposure to female role models will accelerate the process. The small body of research on this matter indicates that young servicemen who were led by female officers did not readily change their male-female prejudices as a consequence.28 This is despite the fact that the available research—again, rather scanty and confined to the US service academies—indicates few differences in the leadership styles of male and female cadets.29

Finally, the administrative culture of the ADF itself presents impediments. The most recent report on the ongoing audit of unacceptable behaviour in the ADF noted evidence of greater understanding of the issue but spoke also of a ‘disconnect’ between the intentions of its leadership (senior and local) and understanding/practice on the ground.30 The report commented on the ‘challenges to communicating swiftly and directly to personnel on matters such as organisational change and cultural reform’ posed by the ADF’s rank hierarchy, and of the high reliance on sending information through DEFGRAMs (formal Defence messages) or on placing information on the Defence Restricted Network, as opposed to communicating face-to-face.31

The dynamics of attitudes and values formation

The ADF is not helping itself by using a questionable model of attitude change. ‘YourSay 2014’ presents a model of cultural change as ‘a relatively linear process, from contact→awareness→understanding→positive perception→impact→adoption→embedding→internalisation/commitment’,32 This is a message-based persuasion model of attitude change, which assumes that people change their attitudes when they are provided with the ‘right’ information. Consistent with this model, YourSay 2014 noted that a very large proportion (84 per cent) of ADF members who had a ‘good understanding’ of Pathway to Change were also committed to the program, with 76 per cent of this group believing that it would benefit Defence.33 YourSay thus concludes that support for the program is thus likely to grow as more members come to understand it.

However, such a conclusion may be both unrealistic and overly optimistic. The problem with message-based persuasion is that attitudes can be prey to powerful social and psychological forces that are counter to rational processing.34 For example, for a variety of reasons—because we seek rewards, want to avoid...
sanctions or punishments, or simply have found that it is faster and easier to do so—we often conform to the views of significant others (groups, peers, family, leaders). And, at an even deeper level of consciousness, many of us—perhaps most of us—are prone to take on information that supports already-held beliefs: beliefs that conform to our sense of who we are and what we stand for.

In fact, some research shows that giving people new information and reasons why they should thus change their views can actually entrench them more deeply in opposition to what is proposed. Everyday examples can be found at every hand, ranging from rejection of climate science to views on politics and economic performance.

It is not surprising, therefore, that value judgments can often be inherently resistant to rational or moral persuasion. Thus another way of interpreting the inference from the YourSay results is that those who reported having a ‘good understanding’ of Pathway to Change were those who concurred with its principles in the first place, rather than because they now know more about it.

Encouragingly, the ‘problem’ of values change is readily within the grasp of an institution with a powerful leadership culture. As the next section shows, people are far more likely to develop favourable attitudes and values when information on what is ‘correct’ and guidance on how to behave comes from trusted leaders, and when behaviour is reinforced by an organisational climate that signals appropriate conduct and related rewards and sanctions.

Even more encouragingly, those who are subject to such influences often realign their individual and collective self-identities to match those of a trusted leader, thus making them even less prone to the vagaries of social influence.


Wood, ‘Attitude Change’.


The Climate Institute, ‘Climate of the Nation 2013: Australian attitudes on climate change, 2013’, available at http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/climate-of-the-nation-2013.html accessed 16 September 2014; also Jim Chalmers, Glory Daze: how a world-beating nation got so down on itself, Melbourne University Press: Melbourne, 2013, pp. 4-6. Public surveys routinely show that acceptance-rejection of climate change is strongly influenced by values, political orientation and demographic background. And despite the fact that Australia was virtually the only country in the developed world that came through the global financial crisis comparatively unscathed, a 2012 survey showed that Australians nevertheless reported themselves as being less confident in their economy and its prospects than were the hardest-hit citizens of Europe, with even the Spaniards feeling more financially secure at that time.

The influence of leadership on attitudes and values

The following case study illustrates the basic principles underpinning the effect of leadership on behaviour and values.

When CDF Angus Houston began his second term as CDF, he initiated a process to reshape strategic leadership climate in the ADF. It was a climate that badly needed reshaping, with strong collegiality at the most senior levels often displayed only in crises and operational emergencies.

Houston was able to get those at the top to change their approach and to think and act in an integrated manner by exerting direct and indirect influence through three main processes.

First, Houston drew on the credibility accrued throughout his career and particularly in the previous decade. He was widely respected for his variety of career experiences and his efforts in embedding the cultural change program initiated by his predecessor as Chief of the Air Force. Just as importantly, he was seen as the benchmark for ethical behaviour, following his principled stance during the ‘children overboard’ affair. Almost more than almost anyone else in the ADF, he was a man that people were ready to trust.

Second, Houston had a talent for making people feel that they were important to him and that he trusted them to do the right thing. He was a particularly good listener, with the simple but powerful practice of focusing his attention on a speaker when that person was making a point and then following this up with constructive questions.

Finally, Houston established a moral climate in the top team that guided its members in mutually setting standards, discussing issues candidly, and continually reinforcing their appreciation of and respect for the views of peers. Houston began by making his expectations clear to those in his team at the very beginning of their appointments. He then had the new team spend time together in a two-day retreat to explore issues and broad options, and to become used to working as a ‘team’. Finally, in an inspired move, he consolidated all this by insisting that the Service Chiefs be co-located in married quarters in Duntroon: where, as one put it, ‘we used to see each other across the back fence’, just as they had earlier in their careers on Service bases. In such an environment, the three could scarcely avoid frequent and candid discussion of important issues.

The success of the strategy was illustrated by the way in which the new team developed the habit of networking in advance of senior meetings. They quickly got to the stage, as one put it, ‘where one Service Chief would be prepared to argue the projects of another Service even at the expense of his own’. As another put it, ‘we fully accept that each Service doesn’t deliver its own form of military power by itself. Rather, the ADF exists to operate as an entity, so we should make strategic decisions with that in mind’. Another remarked that ‘all of us—the Secretary, the CDF, and the Service Chiefs—get it’ regarding strategy. There has been a concerted effort in the last few years to develop this collegiality and we need to keep it solid’. They had become institutionally rather than parochially oriented.39

The approach used by CDF Houston involved three processes that are fundamental to values-based leadership at any level. Leaders establish credibility and command attention by practising what this review calls the ‘3Rs’: ‘reflecting’ the character and standards of the entity with which their followers identify; ‘relating’ to group members in ways that engage and build mutual respect, self-esteem and self-efficacy; and

---

‘reinforcing’ the process via a moral climate that serves as a continual reminder of what is acceptable and unacceptable.40

‘Reflecting’: the exemplary prototype

Leaders gain inherent authority by the extent to which they personify what a group stands for: by the way that they ‘look right, act right, speak right, feel right’ in terms of the competencies and character traits that are valued by that collective entity. As followers, we infer authority and credibility on—and thus we trust—those whom we see as reflecting what our particular social/professional entity stands for. The literature refers to this as ‘prototypicality’.41

Fifty years ago, The Australian newspaper was about to publish its first edition. Its young chief knew that he faced formidable competition from other media companies. Moreover, distance and weather combined to increase the logistic challenges of getting the daily galley proofs to the other capital cities and printing the paper in time for the morning editions (the editorial process occurred in Canberra, and it was in the middle of a foggy winter). In those early days, Rupert Murdoch led from the front. He was always to be found at the centre of activity, where, jacketless and tie loosened, he brought his journalistic experience to every function of the operation and inspired his staff by his enthusiasm and focus. He was, at that stage of his career, the personification of what quality journalism stood for.42

Prototypical leaders gain trust by being identifiable as ‘one of us’ in terms of what ‘we’ value. Like the young Rupert Murdoch, they present themselves as people who are highly competent in doing what matters for that group. In the same vein, Chris Masters’ book on the Australian Army notes the ‘unspoken convention’ among junior officers that ‘their authority will weaken’ unless they appeared to be fit enough to do the various soldiers’ tasks themselves.43

Both the Murdoch and Masters examples above illustrate subtle but important features that characterise leadership in Australia. We react positively to charismatic behaviour but more to ‘small-c’ charisma than to outwardly heroic and larger-than-life charisma.44 We prefer our leaders to be exemplars but on a human, down-to-earth scale: the ‘captain-coach’ rather than the ‘patrician’. And we distrust authority only when we see it as likely to be unconstructive: when we believe that the authority appreciates our perspective and will benefit us, we are usually more

40 This depiction of the 3Rs model is adapted from a similar schema in Haslam, Reicher and Platow, The New Psychology of Leadership.


One of the main benefits of a leader’s prototypicality is that it provides a sense of reassurance. Prototypicality suggests that despite any changes leaders might make to structure or practice, they would not do anything to damage the core aspects of collective identity. Prototypical leaders implicitly convey the message of ‘trust me and work with me: I will not let the group down’. This makes it possible for them to present the rationale for change as being likely to bring the group (or larger social entity) closer to its ‘true’ identity and that, whatever changes, ‘we will still be us’.

Such an approach is likely to have particular resonance for those who identify strongly with their group, as will often be the case in the ADF. Thus legendary Australian World War 1 leader Harold ‘Pompey’ Elliott told his 7th Battalion officers and NCOs shortly after the battalion was formed that their task as leaders was ‘to make the 7th as outstanding as Cromwell’s Ironsides, whose proud boast it was after 15 years of service that no enemy had ever seen their backs’. A classic example from the corporate world is Steve Jobs’ revitalisation of Apple, when he returned as CEO with a promise to take the company back to its roots to the innovative practices that had made it successful in the first place.

The prototypical leader advantage applies not only in tribal organisations like the ADF. It is not just Nelson on his bridge, Rommel in his tank, Napoleon on his horse, and Bader in his Spitfire; it is also the Australian cricket captain at the crease, publisher-in-chief Murdoch on the production floor, and (PR consultants hope) prime ministers in hard hats on building sites. However, the specific indicators of prototypicality vary according to the group or social/professional entity involved. This is nicely brought out in a recent study of language and culture in the Defence institution by Elizabeth Thomson, who points to the differences between the APS ‘knowledge code’, which gives weight to qualifications, skills and experience (‘trust me because I know’) and the ADF ‘knower code’, which gives greater weight to rank, function and tribal status (‘trust me because I am who I am’).

Change will be more acceptable when presented as being likely to bring the group closer to its ‘true’ identity.

---

53 For this reasons, leaders in the military tend to gain further credit by displaying certain idiosyncrasies and being a ‘character’; for example, tank beret-wearing Bernard Montgomery, cigar-chomping George Patton, etc. Australian senior officers have tended to avoid this practice but it is not at all uncommon at the ship and unit
Like Houston, Murdoch, Elliott and Jobs, the actions of the prototypical leader implicitly hold up a mirror that serves as a perpetual reminder to the group of what it stands for and should strive to be. And, given the right skill and the right circumstances, words or symbolic representation can speak almost as loudly as actions.

The famous speeches in which Winston Churchill evoked the finest traditions of his country in the dark days of 1940 reminded its citizens of who they were and what they were capable of (with the not-inconsiderable bonus of presenting Churchill as the personification of such core values).

A similar effect is said to have been achieved by Henry V's Saint Crispin's Day speech ('we few, we happy few, we band of brothers'), which positioned the King as a warrior among peers rather than as a lofty monarch. History tells us of the stirring words of Elizabeth I to her troops during the Spanish Armada crisis ('I know I have the body of a weak, feeble woman; but I have the heart and stomach of a king; aye, and of a king of England too'), which is said to have cut through any issue that prevented her gender being an impediment to her authority. And Nelson Mandela achieved an extraordinary turnaround in white acceptance by becoming an enthusiastic supporter of his country's rugby team during the locally-staged 1995 series.54

Similarly, acts that can be interpreted as indicative of a leader's group-oriented motivation—that is, that show the leader's commitment to the group interest—feed into acceptance and trust. This is a powerful reason why authority is enhanced by actions such as self-sacrifice on behalf of the group, or by allocation decisions that favour the group over others and public expressions of commitment to the group and its interests.55

The prototypical leader's reflection of what is best in the group often accords them a number of advantages. For example, it enhances their licence to depart from what the group may have previously regarded as 'normal', 56 makes them more likely to be seen as charismatic, trustworthy and—regardless of the context—probably more 'heroic', and tends to give them greater leeway, with followers being more tolerant of occasional poor performance.57

They are also more likely to gain from an attribution effect, whereby organisational successes are disproportionately attributed to that leader's influence. Thus, Nelson Mandela was given some credit by his white population for the Springboks' World Cup victory, even though he had had very little direct influence on the outcome.

‘Relating’: the fair dealer

The second fundamental element of the 3Rs concerns the collective and individual relationships between a leader and the group and its members.

---

54 Haslam, Reicher and Platow, The New Psychology of Leadership. This is one reason why politicians spend a great deal of time accumulating political capital by activities such as being photographed in hardhats, on industrial sites, and engaging in or attending sporting events.


Followers instinctively trust and respond positively to a respected leader who treats them fairly and considerately. One of the main reasons for this is that such treatment evokes a reciprocation effect, whereby followers feel motivated to live up to the leader’s efforts to establish the relationship.

The two essential elements of relating are leading in an authentic manner and giving individualised consideration to team members.

Authentic leadership is the extent to which a leader demonstrates integrity, transparency and consistency (in Australian vernacular, is ‘fair dinkum’). Authenticity has four main elements: active self-awareness (for example, seeking feedback about their interactions with others); relational transparency (for example, being honest and willing to admit mistakes); internalised moral perspective (for example, acting in ways that are consistent with espoused values); and balanced processing (for example, actively seeking information that tests their own assumptions and adapt their behaviour in the face of evidence). The following case study illustrates the effect.

Two months into an early-career training course for junior soldiers, squad leader sergeants were rated by their soldiers on the extent to which they led in an authentic manner (these were measured according to indicators of the dimensions in the previous paragraph, with the squad leaders being given no particular training or guidance on their leadership style beyond what they learned on routine Army courses).

Each soldier was then rated a few months later by peers on a number of ethical and pro-social criteria, viz. moral identity, moral courage, ethical behaviour, and teamwork. Those with the highest ratings on all four criteria were those whose squad leaders who had most closely conformed to the authentic style. There was an observable stage-by-stage effect: the squad leader’s authentic and supportive leadership first lifted moral identity and courage, and this in turn resulted in stronger ethical behaviour and teamwork.

Given that the authentic leaders had delivered the same curriculum as their less-authentic colleagues, it is reasonable to assume that the behavioural outcomes were essentially due to the effects of the NCOs’ personal styles.

The other aspect of being a fair dealer entails what the literature calls ‘individualised consideration’: the readiness to engage with others and treat them as individuals and as fellow professionals, rather than simply as members of the group. A large number of studies, many of which were conducted in the military, confirm the influence of individualised consideration on behaviour and values. One was conducted in the Taiwanese army, thus pointing to the universality of the effect.

---


Leadership practices in the Taiwanese army were studied in over 300 NCO-soldier dyads in 42 functional units. Some of the dyads were led by NCOs who showed individualised consideration and respect to team members as individuals, with other NCOs taking a more transactional approach by indicating how soldiers would be rewarded for certain activities or censured for others. Analysis showed that soldiers in the first category were subsequently more likely to display optimism, hope, self-efficacy, and identification with the team. Part of the effect was shown to be due to a phenomenon called 'emotional contagion', by which the early positive responses of team members spread within the team, further enhancing the leadership effect.62

Individualised consideration helps each team member to feel valued both as an individual and as a member of the team. The enhancement of the individual's self-esteem and sense of agency gets a further psychological boost if the leader gives them some autonomy within their own situation.63 This makes them not only more confident about taking on greater professional and moral challenges but often has the additional benefit of increasing their openness to new ideas and approaches, even for those for whom such ideas might once have been threatening.64 The effect will be even more powerful if such new ideas come from a respected leader or leadership group—and particularly if the ideas are, at least in the first instance, not too radical.

Incidentally, there is a subtle but important difference between being supportive and being friendly. Pompey Elliott was renowned as a tough disciplinarian but his soldiers appreciated his being 'absolutely straight, and incapable of deviousness: you knew where you stood with Pompey... and the way he took a personal interest in them as individuals, even though he had over a thousand men under his command'.65 And Chris Masters notes that 'if you asked the diggers about their commanders, the biggest thing they will say is that they are good at looking after us, and standing up for us'.66

The effect is amplified if the leader articulates a desired future state and, explicitly or implicitly, invites followers to join in the journey towards the relevant outcome (see the earlier example of Pompey Elliott's 'Ironsides' vision). The prospect of achieving a valued outcome in partnership with a trusted leader often results in strong motivation and intrinsic satisfaction.

The final example relates not to organisations but to the classroom. A review of nearly 5000 studies on what makes a good clinical teacher in medicine concluded that it had much to do with 'inspiring, supporting, actively involving and communicating with students', with teaching excellence 'dominated [by] non-cognitive

---


All these examples show the often-unacknowledged utility of fair and considerate leadership. Beyond the issue of leaders making ethical operational and personnel decisions, fair and considerate leadership tends to be seen as reliable leadership. And followers are more likely to trust and accept the values and direction of reliable leaders.

'Reinforcing': the ethical manager

It is one thing to exert influence through inspiration and individual treatment; it is another to consolidate that behaviour into a group climate—that is, a shared set of values and code of conduct—that promotes consistent ethical behaviour across a range of contexts.68

Leaders create such a climate when they:

- Provide explicit and implicit guidance for behaving correctly;
- Establish, communicate, model and enforce standards;
- Publicly define success not just by results but also by the way it is attained;
- Regularly discuss professional ethics and values with members; and
- Work with team members to use all these elements to make fair and balanced decisions.69

Successful leaders establish ethical climates over time that guide and reinforce standards

Such a climate and its effects was the focus of a recent set of studies conducted in US military and civilian organisations explored the processes involved in and the behavioural influences of establishing codes of behaviour that explicitly defined appropriate conduct and standards in each context.

The climate in each organisation was measured in terms of codes of behaviour that explicitly defined appropriate local conduct and standards. The code of behaviour in each case was called 'Duty Orientation', defined in terms of duty to mission, standards, and team and members. The research also examined the separate effect of leadership in terms of the 'authentic' style described earlier. Three major sets of findings emerged. Firstly, regardless of the sample and organisation involved—military recruits, junior soldiers, or corporate employees—Duty Orientation was invariably strongest in groups led in a way that could be broadly described as 'authentic'. Secondly, the stronger the Duty Orientation, the more ethical was the climate.

---


69 Treviño, Brown and Hartman, ‘A qualitative investigation of perceived executive ethical leadership’; and Walumbwa, Hartnell and Oke, ‘Servant leadership, procedural justice climate, service climate, employee attitudes, and organisational citizenship behavior’.
individual and collective behaviour in each team. Finally, the strongest behavioural effects were observed in teams with both supportive leadership and strong Duty Orientation, i.e., both factors contributed to the behavioural outcomes.  

Figure 1 illustrates the processes involved. It shows that leadership has both direct and indirect influence. Direct influence comes from example, edict or supervision, with indirect influence coming from the ways in which a leader shapes a follower’s moral identity and moral courage. Both effects in turn are consolidated within an appropriate climate.

The effect was shown even more clearly in a study involving over 2500 combat troops in a number of US Army company-sized elements during deployment to Iraq (see Figure 2).

Ethical standards were established in each company by a ‘trickledown’ process. Trickle-down was driven by both a direct effect (the leadership of each company commander) and an indirect effect (the strength of the respective company-level ethical climates). Both factors were significant in influencing standards, with the indirect effect multiplying the direct effect at each level of individual leadership. At each organisational level, therefore, the ‘leadership total’ effect—personal and environmental—was greater than the sum of its individual parts.

---


The ultimate effect of 3Rs leadership: Emulation of values and identity

The ultimate effect of 3Rs leadership influence is when followers model themselves on their leader, taking on key elements of that leader’s values, identity and perspectives, and coming to identify with a ‘we’ whose goals are aligned with those of the leader.\(^74\)

Values and identity emulation can occur only when the leader gains implicit authority by reflecting group norms and relating supportively with followers. Followers will then generally respond by paying more attention and giving more weight to that leader’s views and approach. This generally is followed by their modifying their behaviour in accordance with that leader’s expectations.

Finally, this tendency is reinforced if the leader has established a group climate that clearly signals and rewards the behaviour that is valued and consistently sanctions departures from such standards. Further reinforcement is likely to occur via a ‘contagion effect’, whereby followers observe their peers making the same kinds of behavioural adjustments and are thus strengthened in their own habits.

\(^73\) Sourced from Schaubroek et al, ‘Embedding ethical leadership within and across organizational levels’, p. 1055.

Identity modelling is reinforced by continued exposure to that leader or leadership culture (see Figure 3). A long-term, values-based relationship between leader and follower continually (even if unconsciously) reminds each member of who they are and what they stand for both as an individual and as a team member. In turn, such followers are likely to play their part in shaping the values of incoming group members. Institutions such as the ADF can achieve this despite a high rate of officer job rotation and ‘churn’, by creating strong leadership cultures based on consistent high-quality training, supported by the senior sailor/NCO parallel chain of command, and all guided by a strong ethos of officerhood.75

![Figure 3: The leadership identity modelling process](image)

**Summary**

This section examined some of the important psychological dynamics associated with attitude and value change. It showed that people’s attitudes and values are powerfully influenced by leaders who ‘reflect’ what the group stands for, ‘relate’ to members in a fair, ethical and supportive fashion, and ‘reinforce’ explicit and implicit behavioural cues within an appropriate local climate.

The implication is that leadership effectiveness requires ‘the whole package’. Leaders need to be able to perform in ways that exemplify the professional standards valued by the group. They need to be willing and able to develop strong and ethical relationships with followers. And they need to be willing and able to embed appropriate behaviour with an ethical climate that guides appropriate conduct beyond the immediate influence of the leader(s).


Implications for inclusion management

In strategy the longest way around is often the shortest way there.

Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, *The Strategy of Indirect Approach* 77

The essence

The review found that workable strategies for changing values have little to do with the direct approach of rational persuasion (including giving people more information). Instead, it found that the key to cultural change of many types is to tackle the problem indirectly, by the leadership styles practised at local (ship and unit) levels, and by the manner in which those local leaders frame the issue for their followers.

The ADF will facilitate cultural change of all kinds by promoting and developing practice of the 3Rs. The 3Rs model has the advantages of being neat, comprehensible and valid. And while it has the disadvantages of being seen as 'yet another competing leadership model', such disadvantages may be offset by the fact that 3Rs practice is unlikely to require major changes to the approach and content of existing leadership development programs. In most cases, all that is required is some overall reframing and reorientation.

Those who lead in ways that are consistent with the 3Rs model create a motivational effect that turns 'members' into 'followers' whose goals align with those of their leader. In this respect, shaping support for inclusion—though it may be more challenging—is little different to shaping any particular professional value or attitude.

Local leaders can further facilitate the values shaping process by the way that they communicate the rationale for change. There are significant advantages in expressing the rationale for change as a return to the roots of the institution, so as to bring it closer to its 'true' identity, the enacting of which are likely to make the institution more closely resemble its ideal. In the case of support for inclusion, this could be usefully framed in terms of the traditional 'warrior code' that demands that those bearing arms use them responsibly in accordance with the 'warrior's honour'. 78 This represents a contemporary form of chivalry and of doing what is necessary to be worthy of the nation's trust and respect. 79

Strengths, opportunities and vulnerabilities in the 3Rs

The 3Rs approach to leadership articulates what has always been regarded as 'commonsense best practice' in the ADF's most important soft capability. It might be expected therefore that such an 'old basic' would be subject to much monitoring and evaluation, and/or research aimed at improving understanding of what is admittedly a slippery concept. But this is not the case. Until comparatively recently—and, even then, only in the Navy's case—the ADF has done little in pursuit of either goal. Thus any assessment of the state of each of the three elements can only be speculative.


Emotional intelligence measurements recently gathered at the Australian Command and Staff College (ACSC) show ADF officers as being strong on ‘task-oriented’ aspects of leadership but with some weaknesses in ‘relating’. These latter weaknesses are in terms of emotional intelligence/relationships-oriented aspects of leadership, particularly in respect to self-awareness and empathy.  

The only other piece of readily-available research is an unpublished study of Army leadership by then-Major Christine Clay in 1998 in preparation for a postgraduate thesis. The leadership styles of company commanders were measured from the perspectives of both the company commanders themselves and their subordinate officers. The findings of a population survey of all Army units mirror the findings of the aforementioned research on emotional intelligence, in that company commanders at that time were relatively strong on task-oriented aspects of leadership and relatively weak in the areas of subordinate support and relationships. For example, among the lower rated items by subordinate officers were ‘helps others develop their strengths’ (60% either agreed or strongly agreed) and ‘spends time teaching and coaching’ (46%). The company commanders themselves saw their behaviour in this respect as extremely satisfactory, with respective ratings of 84% and 91%.

There is no data related to leadership climate and to the ‘reinforcement’ dimension.  

Possible reasons for weaknesses in emotional intelligence/relationships include:

- A lack of awareness among junior (and perhaps other) officers that emotional intelligence is a crucial professional capacity;
- Inadequate understanding or appreciation of the extent to which leaders must give appropriate attention to people as well as to task;
- A lack of opportunity for junior officers to develop emotional intelligence capacity; and
- Work pressures that eat into the time that they should be spending developing supportive relationships with team members.

All these aspects can be readily addressed by appropriate career management and development programs. However, the effectiveness and efficiency of such programs depends on accurate diagnosis in the first place, and this is hampered by the lack of research and systematic measurement across the ADF, particularly in the Army and the Air Force. YourSay surveys make no attempt at rigorous assessment for either leadership or climate, with issues on the local leadership generally targeted at ‘my supervisor’ as opposed to ‘officers in my ship/unit’.

However, as indicated earlier, the Navy is in a somewhat better position than the other two Services. While a considerable body of research has been assembled on leadership practices and ethical climate in ships and shore establishments, as measured by the ‘Human Synergistics’ circumplex model and its associated ‘Life Styles Inventory’ instrument, the results are not yet publically available.  

---

80 The results from these surveys were provided, necessarily in confidence, by the Commandant of the ACSC.
82 This may well change in late 2014 when the Navy case study is intended to be one of the highlights at the annual Australasian Human Synergistics conference.
Gaps in the literature

The review noted a number of major gaps in the literature, of which four stand out. To begin with, there is very little in the literature that addresses the inclusion issue at the local leadership level. The few scholarly studies that have been conducted in this area focus on senior leadership.

Secondly, there have been surprisingly few comparisons between the leadership styles of male and female military professionals. While there is a small but informative literature on male-female comparisons at the military cadet level and a growing literature on comparisons in business organisations, military scholars have yet to make the extension. Because of the strong socialisation and training processes to which embryo leaders are subjected, we might expect few male-female leadership style differences early in the career but subtle and important differences might emerge as officers mature and act more in accordance with their own perspectives. The military institution and its male majority in particular could learn much from examination of this question.

Thirdly, consistent with the second point, we know little about leadership styles across the career trajectory. We would expect to find differences in leadership styles for junior, middle level and senior leaders but to what extent do these actually exist and in what dimensions of leadership practice? And how does this apply in both the military and within society at large?

Finally, although the ADF has an intense interest in leadership as a practice, it shows scarcely any interest in leadership as a topic for research. Scholarly research does not seem to be antithetical to other military institutions, so why would it be the case in Australia?

Not only would cultural reform benefit considerably from research on core issues but such research could well be part of the method by which the Australian military institution demonstrates itself as something of which the nation can continue to be proud.

The reasons for this are not clear. Is it that the ADF’s pragmatic culture is unsympathetic to ‘academic’ research? Is there some fear that research results might be used by the media and cause embarrassment? Is there some apprehension that the myths of ADF leadership might not be reflected in objective reality? Whatever the reasons, the question deserves examination at the most senior levels.

And, whatever such reasons, they should no longer be used as an excuse for not forging ahead. The ADF surely owes it to itself to become more serious about scholarly research on one of its most important elements of professionalism. Wherever the research is conducted—within and by the institution itself (for example, at the Australian Defence College or Australian Defence Force Academy) and/or through programs sponsored in appropriate university departments (a common practice in the US and Canada), the process could be kick-started with the hypotheses listed in Annex B.
Conclusion

If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.

Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, 1958

There is nothing in this review that would be alien to a military professional. The ‘new look’ that the ADF seeks can be best realised by concentration on some ‘old basics’.

The key to reshaping attitudes and values of any kind—but especially those that relate to potentially contentious and deeply-held values such as inclusion and diversity—lies at the local leadership level. And the 3Rs process presents a simple but far from simplistic model to guide appropriate practice.

The utility of the 3Rs model goes beyond its application in diversity management. Reflecting, relating and reinforcing are important not just to build a sense of collective identity, self-efficacy and commitment to a certain set of values or certain group outcome. The three elements have equal relevance to the overall process of leadership itself. They are particularly relevant for establishing the conditions in which leaders and followers can work effectively together on ‘wicked problems’, that is, problems that not only defy easy solution but also defy ready understanding and analysis. Addressing wicked problems requires trust on the part of both leaders and followers, a trust which stems from strong respect built on strong relationships.

Potential vulnerabilities exist, however, and it is disappointing that the paucity of relevant research means that the evidence on these must be essentially speculative. The ADF, with its strong ethical climate, well-ingrained leadership culture and ethos of officership, and sophisticated personnel systems has a significant advantage over other organisations in creating and sustaining appropriate behavioural standards. Or to put the argument slightly differently: if the ADF can’t do this, which organisation can?

---


Annex A: Definitions of key terms

Attitude
A psychological tendency expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour.

Ethical leadership
The demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to followers through two-way communication, reinforcement and decision making.

Identity
A person's distinctive sense, idea or mental image of who they are and what they stand for.

Inclusion and support for inclusion
Inclusion relates to the extent to which opportunities for employment and advancement in a workplace are equivalent for all demographic groups. Support for inclusion is the extent to which members of the dominant social/cultural groups except the legitimacy of such practices.

Leadership
A process of engaging others in concerted efforts to pursue a goal, in conditions of complexity and uncertainty or in anticipation of such conditions.

Moral identity
The particular sense, idea or mental image one has of one's moral concerns and commitments.

Moral courage
Willingness to speak out about and stand up for what is right.

Prosocial behaviour
Behaviour characterised by a concern about the rights, feelings and welfare of other people, including empathy and concern for others and behaving in ways to help or benefit other people.

Trust
Reliance on the integrity, strength, ability, surety etc of a person. Trust can take the form of either:

- Cognition trust, based on performance-relevant cognitions such as competence, responsibility, reliability and dependability; or
- Affective trust, relating to the emotional bonds between individuals that are grounded upon expressions of genuine care and concern for the welfare of the other party

Values
Principles or standards of behaviour that are implicitly accepted as guides to individual or collective behaviour.

**Annex B: Proposed hypotheses for ADF leadership research**

This annex contains two sets of hypotheses: those relating specifically to support for inclusion, and those concerned with gender differences in leadership styles.

**Support for inclusion**

The first four hypotheses relate to the variables discussed in this review. They would investigate the respective influences of leadership style; moral identity; moral courage; duty orientation (or an appropriate form of code of conduct, such as the Navy's signature behaviours); and ethical climate.

**H 1**
The more authentic the leader is perceived by group members, and the more transformational the leader's style, the stronger will be support for inclusion among group members.

**H 2**
The stronger the moral identity, moral courage and duty orientation of an individual, the stronger will be his/her support for inclusion.

**H 3**
The stronger the ethical climate in a ship or unit, the stronger will be each member's support for inclusion.

**H 4**
The relationship between authentic/transformational leadership on the one hand and moral identity, moral courage, duty orientation and support for inclusion on the other hand will be moderated by both the ethical climate and by the appreciation by members that support for inclusion is an important institutional value. (That is, for example, those with strong moral identity will respond to authentic/transformational leadership by even stronger support for inclusion, in comparison with their peers with weaker moral identity.)

**Gender differences in leadership styles**

The second set of hypotheses relate to gender differences in leadership styles and the consequent behavioural effects.

**H 5 (null hypothesis)**

Male and female leaders in the ADF in equivalent roles and equivalent career stages have essentially similar leadership styles.

**H 6 (null hypotheses)**

Male and female leaders in the ADF in equivalent roles and equivalent career stages have essentially similar leadership styles, as perceived by their male subordinates.

Male and female leaders in the ADF in equivalent roles and equivalent career stages have essentially similar leadership styles, as perceived by their female subordinates.
H 7

Male and female leaders in the ADF demonstrate differences in leadership styles, with women showing stronger ‘relating’ behaviour, as perceived by their male subordinates.

H 8

Male and female leaders in the ADF demonstrate differences in leadership styles, with women showing stronger ‘relating’ behaviour, as perceived by their female subordinates.